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CIA HISTORICAL STAFF

## The Support Services Historical Series

THE OFFICE OF TRAINING, 1 JULY 1956 - 1 JANUARY 1966

VOLUME IV: THE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL  
1 JULY 1956 - 1 JANUARY 1966

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OTR - 8

November 1971

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## W A R N I N G

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THE SUPPORT SERVICES HISTORICAL SERIES

OTR - 8

THE OFFICE OF TRAINING

1 JULY 1956 - 1 JANUARY 1966

VOLUME IV: THE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL

1 JULY 1956 - 1 JANUARY 1966

by



25)

November 1971



Hugh T. Cunningham  
Director of Training

25)

HISTORICAL STAFF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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THE OFFICE OF TRAINING, 1 JULY 1956 - 1 JANUARY 1966

Volume IV: The Intelligence School  
1 July 1956 - 1 January 1966

I. Background

The early efforts of the Office of Training in the field of non-operational intelligence training, from 1951 to late 1953, have been described in Volume I of this paper; and developments in intelligence and administrative training from December 1953 to July 1956 are covered in Volume II. In the interests of continuity, however, it would be well at this point to review the background briefly -- to trace the antecedent action, so to speak, and to describe the status of the Intelligence School at the time that it was established in 1956.

A. Antecedents

The earliest identifiable OTR ancestor of the Intelligence School was the "CIA Intelligence School," established in May of 1951. 1/\* The mission of this "school," as stated by the DTR at the time, was "to provide a training center to produce intelligence officers, on a

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\* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix D.

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continuing basis, who will have a clear understanding of how to support the Agency's mission in the field of National Intelligence." 2/ The school had three objectives -- one immediate, one eventual, and one long-range. The immediate objective was to start a basic training course for junior intelligence officers. The eventual objective was to offer refresher courses for experienced intelligence officers. The long-range objective was to offer graduate-level courses for the entire intelligence community.

By July 1951 the first objective had been reached; the first basic course for junior officers had been designed and scheduled for offering. 3/ The second objective was reached somewhat later but not during the brief life of the "CIA Intelligence School." The third objective was never reached. Actually, although the name of the school continued to be used until July 1952, 4/ its activities never expanded beyond the offering of the basic orientation course for junior officer

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trainees; and after September 1952 that course was being given by the Intelligence Training Division of TR(G), \* which had been established at that time. \*\*

The Intelligence Training Division at that time also gave a course in world communism and a course in rapid reading. The TR(G) Basic Training Division, also established in September 1952, gave orientation courses and courses in management and administrative training. Both the Intelligence and Basic Divisions were re-named in the December 1954 reorganization of OTR. \*\*\* The "TR(G)" designation was dropped, and the Divisions became Schools.\*\*\*\* The two schools continued in this pattern until they were combined by the reorganization of 15 June 1956.\*\*\*\*\*

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\* TR(G) was the abbreviation used for Training (General), the non-covert unit in OTR; the covert unit was Training (Special) -- TR(S).

\*\* See Figure 1, p. 4.

\*\*\* See OTR-6, p. 3.

\*\*\*\* See Figure 2, p. 5.


\*\*\*\*\* See Figure 3, p. 6.

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Figure 1

## ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF TRAINING

17 September 1952




ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF TRAINING AS OF 17 SEPTEMBER 1952, SHOWING THE REORGANIZATION OF BOTH TRAINING (COVERT) AND TRAINING (OVERT), THE CHANGE FROM ASSISTANT DIRECTORS TO DEPUTY DIRECTORS, FROM TRAINING (COVERT) TO TRAINING (SPECIAL) AND TRAINING (OVERT) TO TRAINING (GENERAL), AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUPPORT STAFF RESPONSIBLE DIRECTLY TO THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING; BY OTR NOTICE NO. 26-52, 1 DECEMBER 1952. (NOTE THAT THE CHANGES HAD BEEN IN EFFECT SOME TEN WEEKS BEFORE THEY WERE OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED.)

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Figure 2

## ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF TRAINING

1 December 1954




ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF TRAINING AS OF 1 DECEMBER 1954, SHOWING THE COMBINATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF AND THE INSTRUCTIONAL SERVICES STAFF TO FORM THE SUPPORT STAFF, THE TRANSFER OF THE PLANS AND RESEARCH STAFF TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING, AND THE REORGANIZATION OF THE TRAINING DIVISIONS INTO TRAINING SCHOOLS; BY OTR NOTICE NO. 28-54, 1 DECEMBER 1954.

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Figure 3

## ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF TRAINING

15 June 1956



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ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF TRAINING AS OF 15 JUNE 1956,  
SHOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL  
COMMUNISM, THE MERGER OF THE BASIC TRAINING SCHOOL AND  
THE INTELLIGENCE TRAINING SCHOOL AS THE INTELLIGENCE  
SCHOOL, THE CHANGE IN NAME FROM LANGUAGE, AREA AND EXTER-  
NAL TRAINING SCHOOL TO LANGUAGE AND AREA SCHOOL, AND  
THE CHANGE IN NAME FROM OPERATIONS TRAINING SCHOOL TO  
OPERATIONS SCHOOL; BY OTR NOTICE NO. 20-56, 15 JUNE 1956.

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B. Status of the Intelligence School, 15 June 1956

Perhaps the best summary statement of the missions of the Intelligence School as of 15 June 1956 is that given by Mr. Baird in his official report of OTR activities during fiscal year 1956. 5/ He stated that the school was responsible for "all training other than language, area, operations, and communism instruction" -- a statement that would seem to justify the later comment by [redacted] characterizing the school as "a hodge-podge, a catch-all, an attic, a dumping ground where courses were placed that did not belong anywhere else."\* Mr. Baird did, however, move from the negative to the positive by specifying in his report the kinds of training for which the school was responsible: orientation to the intelligence process and to clandestine activity; administrative principles and procedures pertaining to support functions at headquarters and in the field; management and supervisory principles and techniques; induction and refresher training for clerks, typists, and stenographers; methods and techniques

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\* See OTR-6, p. 13.

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of effective writing and speaking; the improvement of reading skill; and skills and methods involved in the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence.

In June 1956 there was no formal internal organization. There  
25X1 was a chief, [redacted] but no deputy chief, and there was an orientation and briefing officer; the many and varied responsibilities were carried out by groups, the composition of which might change from time to time as training requirements and instructor availability dictated. 25X9 There was a total of [redacted] positions -- administrative, instructor, and clerical -- in the school. 6/

It is interesting to note that in Mr. Baird's specifications of the responsibilities of the school he neglected to mention one -- the support of training programs that were given by other government agencies. This responsibility the school had at the time; during fiscal year 1956, for example, instructors in the two schools that merged to form the Intelligence School provided 78 lectures for other government training programs. 7/ This activity continued to be a large part of the school's task throughout its existence.

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## II. Organization and Personnel

### A. Organizational Development

From 15 June 1956 to 15 February 1957, the Intelligence School functioned with a chief and the several loosely organized groups described above. In February a deputy chief was appointed; but no action was taken to establish a definite internal organization. The first step in this direction came in March 1957, when the newly appointed

25X1 deputy chief, [redacted] prepared a staff study of the school's organizational problem. 8/ The study pointed out that there were [redacted]

25X

25X9 instructors in the school and [redacted] of them reported directly to the chief or the deputy chief. To solve the span-of-control problem inherent in such a situation, the study recommended that four "faculties" be established, each with a chief instructor reporting to the chief of the school.

The 27 courses offered by the school would be distributed among these four faculties -- all management, supervision, operations support, and clerical training to the Management and Administrative Faculty; all orientation and briefing courses and activities to the Intelligence Orientation Faculty; all skills courses -- reading, writing, and speaking -- to the Intelligence Techniques Faculty; and all courses dealing with intelligence methods to the Intelligence Production Faculty.

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Apparently no action was taken on the study's recommendations; for on 4 April 1957 the chief of the school -- then [redacted] -- wrote to the DDTR and suggested an alternative plan. 9/ Instead of the four faculties recommended by the deputy chief, the chief suggested only three: a Management-Clerical-Administrative Faculty, an Orientation Faculty, and an Intelligence Techniques Faculty. Again, there appears to be no record of official action having been taken on the chief's memorandum, and the result was that the June 1956 organizational pattern was retained, with the "groups" designated "faculties" and a chief instructor assigned to each.

By mid-1957, then, the Intelligence School was composed of a chief and a deputy chief; an Orientation and Briefing Officer and an editor of the Studies in Intelligence, both reporting to the chief; and six training faculties -- Intelligence Orientation, Intelligence Production, Management, Clerical, Administrative, and Reading Improvement. This organization did reduce from sixteen to eight the number of people reporting directly to the chief, but it did not fully solve the span-of-control problem. The reasons behind the rejection of the recommendations of the chief and the deputy chief are not recorded. It is the opinion of an OTR officer who became chief of one of the six

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faculties at the time and later became chief of the school\* that the reasons rested in personalities. Some of the senior instructors protested subordination to other -- perhaps less senior -- instructors and insisted on retaining semi-autonomy in their substantive areas. Mr. Baird's decision was a compromise made in the interests of harmony and efficiency. 10/

With the exception of the elimination of the deputy chief position in April 1959, the appointment of a GS-11 Executive Assistant to assist the chief, the addition of the Specialist in Programmed Instruction later in the same year, and the elimination of the Reading Improvement Faculty in 1958, the structure of the school remained unchanged until October 1962. At that time, the Operations Support Faculty was transferred from the Intelligence School to the Operations School. There were two reasons for the move. First, the faculty's courses -- Operations Support and Administrative Procedures -- were oriented toward operational activity and thus logically belonged in the Operations School. This had been true from the beginning, of course, but

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\* The writer of this historical paper.

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the "support" aspects of the courses had always been considered sufficient reason to set them apart from clandestine operational training.

The second reason was that by 1962 the activities of the Operations School had decreased to a very few course offerings; when [redacted]

25X

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
to increase the activities of the school by reducing those of the Intelligence School, which at that time was by far the largest of the OTR schools.

25X

The next organizational change came in November 1963, when the Editor of the Studies in Intelligence was transferred from the Intelligence School to the Office of the Executive Director. Although the "revival" of the Studies was an OTR project assigned to the Intelligence School,\* after it was established as a regular publication the editor worked largely under the direction of the board that was established to govern the publication; he reported to the chief of the school only as an administrative convenience. Because the Executive Director was a

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\* See below, p. 15.

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member of the Studies board and the other members were senior officers of the various Directorates, the logical organizational location of the Studies editorial staff was within the Office of the Executive Director.

The only other organizational change in the Intelligence School through 1965 was the elimination of the Orientation and Briefing Officer position and the assignment of the responsibilities to the Intelligence Orientation Faculty in July 1965. At that time, the name of the faculty was changed to the Orientation and Briefing Faculty. This action was taken because the officer who was in the position resigned from the Agency, and it was decided that the briefing duties could be absorbed by an existing component and thereby a GS-15 slot could be made available to another OTR component. At the end of the 1956-66 period, the organizational structure of the school consisted of the Chief, the executive assistant, and the four faculties -- Orientation and Briefing, Intelligence Production, Management, and Clerical.\*

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\* In April 1966 the Management and Clerical faculties were transferred to the newly established Support School, leaving the Intelligence School with only two faculties.

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25X1 [redacted] remained as chief of the school until 7 January 1957, when he was appointed DDTR. He was succeeded as school chief

25X1 by [redacted] who had been chief instructor of management

25X1 training. [redacted] served until April 1959, when he resigned from the Agency and was replaced by [redacted] who had been

Chief of the Intelligence Production Faculty of the school. [redacted]

continued as chief throughout the remainder of the 1956-66 period and thereafter until his retirement on 1 December 1969.

25X1 [redacted] was the only deputy chief of the school

during the entire 1956-66 period. [redacted] came to OTR early in

1957 from the Contacts Division of the Office of Operations, where he had served briefly after being transferred from the position of Deputy Chief of Economic Research in the Office of Research and Reports.

Before he came to the Agency early in 1953, he had served with US

Air Force Intelligence in the Pentagon. [redacted] was brought into

OTR by Mr. Baird for the primary purpose of re-establishing the

Studies in Intelligence publication -- a task which he soon accomplished.\* He was first assigned to the Plans and Policy Staff, but

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\* See below, p. 25.

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almost immediately thereafter he was appointed Deputy Chief of the Intelligence School. He served in that position until 6 April 1959, when he was appointed Chief of the Intelligence Production Faculty to X1 replace [redacted] who became chief of the school at that time.

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25X1 [redacted] also chose not to have a deputy. Instead, he requested, and was granted, the assignment of an Executive Assistant to the office of the chief of the school. [redacted] a GS-11 Educational Specialist who had served in the Intelligence Training School under [redacted] and later in the Intelligence Production Faculty of the Intelligence School, was appointed to the position.

25X

25X1 In June 1956 [redacted] was the Orientation and Briefing Officer. He resigned from the Agency at the end of August 1956, and on 4 September [redacted] was appointed to succeed him. [redacted] continued in the orientation and briefing job until September 1963, when he was assigned to the position of Assistant to the Director (the DCI) for Public Affairs. He was followed in the briefing officer position by [redacted] an OCI/DDI careerist. Mr.

25X1 [redacted] continued to serve until August 1965, when he resigned from the Agency to accept a position with the Department of State. At that time, as noted above, the briefing officer position was eliminated.

25X1 In June 1956 [redacted] was chief instructor of intelligence orientation training, and a few months later -- when the various "groups" in the school became faculties -- he became Chief of the Intelligence Orientation Faculty. He continued in that position

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until 27 August 1965, when he retired and was succeeded by [redacted] 25X

25X1 [redacted] As noted above, [redacted] 25X

as Chief of the Intelligence Production Faculty in April 1959, and he remained in the position throughout the 1956-66 period and thereafter until his retirement in December 1967. When [redacted] was appointed chief of the school in January 1957, his position as chief instructor of the management training group was taken by [redacted] 25X

25X1 [redacted] a member of the group at the time. [redacted] became Chief of the Management Training Faculty and served until April of 1961. He 25X1 was followed by [redacted] a DDP careerist, who was replaced in February 1962 by [redacted] formerly DDTR and 25X1 Chief of Training [redacted] continued in the position until May 1966 when the faculty was transferred to the Support School and for some years thereafter.

In November 1956 [redacted] 25X

25X1 [redacted] as Chief of the Clerical Training Faculty and continued in the job throughout the rest of the 1956-66 period. [redacted] 25X served as Chief of the Operations Support Faculty during the entire period that the faculty was a part of the Intelligence School. In June

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25X11956 [redacted] who had replaced [redacted]

25X

[redacted]  
was chief of the reading improvement group; she became chief of the  
faculty and held the position until it was abolished in 1958.

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III. The Office of the Chief

A. Activities of the Chief

The basic responsibilities of the Chief of the Intelligence School were, of course, those concerned with the direction and management of the school and the coordination of the school's activities with the over-all OTR program. He served as the major channel of communication, both upward and downward. Through written reports, attendance at meetings, and personal conferences, he kept the DTR informed about the school's programs; and he held regular weekly meetings with his faculty chiefs to keep them informed of significant OTR and Agency developments. His supervisory responsibilities included the monitoring of courses, the evaluation of training methods and programs, the preparation of fitness reports on the faculty chiefs and the review of fitness reports on all personnel of the school, and participation in the preparation of career development plans.

Because the faculties of the school were housed in several different buildings in three different areas -- The Potomac Park area, the E Street Headquarters area, and downtown on Sixteenth Street -- during the period from 1956 to 1963, the chief spent a considerable part of his time on shuttle buses. Even after the OTR move into the

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new headquarters building at Langley, the Clerical Training Faculty remained at the Sixteenth Street location; and after the OTR move to the Glebe Road building, the Orientation and Briefing Officer stayed in Headquarters Building and the Clerical Training Faculty continued in the downtown location.

In addition to his responsibilities in the direction and management of the school, the chief took an active part in training programs.

The degree and nature of this participation varied with the different

25X1 chiefs. [redacted] did relatively little of it; during the first six months of the school's existence -- the period during which [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] was chief -- the work of planning, organization, and development took almost all of the chief's time. [redacted] by delegating duties

to his deputy, freed himself for a great deal of instruction in management and supervision courses. [redacted] after he became chief,

continued to participate in the intelligence production and orientation

courses and acted as chief instructor in some of the advanced writing and speaking courses. He also served frequently as a guest lecturer

in training programs of the Departments of State and Defense, and

often he was chosen to represent the Agency in appearances before

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non-government groups. In fact, during the ten-year period that Mr.

25X1 [redacted] served as chief of the school, at least half of his time was  
spent in teaching, lecturing, and speaking activities. 12/

B. The Deputy Chief

25X1 As noted above, [redacted] was the only deputy chief that the  
school had during the 1956-66 period. He served in the position from  
early in 1957 to April of 1959. Until January 1959 a part of [redacted] 25X  
job was that of Editor of the Studies in Intelligence. \* In April 1957 Dr.

25X1 [redacted] estimated that thirty percent of [redacted] time was to be 25X  
devoted to the Studies, thirty-five percent to liaison with the DDI ele-  
ments of the Agency, twenty-five percent to instruction and other  
classroom activity, and ten percent to the alter ego function of acting  
for the chief of the school. 13/

X1 Whether or not these percentage estimates of the deputy's  
division of labor were realistic is impossible to determine -- and  
largely irrelevant. The records indicate that during the first few  
months of [redacted] tenure as deputy chief, he devoted a major part  
of his time to the problem of reorganizing the school. 14/ It is also

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\* See below, p. 25.

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apparent that he intended to expand the school's programs for DDI personnel to the point where at least twice as many courses would be offered to meet DDI training requirements. 15/ As it turned out, of 25X1 course, [redacted] reorganization plan was not accepted, and the DDI-oriented program expansion did not materialize. According to a senior OTR officer who was closely associated with [redacted] throughout his tenure as deputy chief, he gradually came to feel that his efforts were being deliberately sabotaged by [redacted] and his resentment and frustration led finally to the bitter confrontation noted above. 16/

25X

25X

C. The Executive Assistant

When [redacted] became chief of the school in April 1959, 25X1 he had already served as an instructor in the school for more than two years, and he had concluded that there was no real need for a deputy chief; the administrative responsibilities of the chief were such that, with proper delegation of authority to the faculty chiefs, they could be handled by one man -- and still leave that man time for participation in classroom activities. There were, however, a considerable number of administrative tasks necessary to support the chief -- tasks

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that required professional experience, initiative, and judgment but did not require the attention of an officer at the GS-15 level. These were the tasks assigned to the Executive Assistant.

The most important function of [redacted] who served in 25X the executive assistant position from April 1959 through 1965, was the collection and preparation of the information and data that were necessary for all of the various kinds of reports that the school was required to submit. This activity included the development of budget requests, budget justification, statistical summaries of course offerings and enrollments, equipment purchases and inventory, and accountability for funds. It involved not only close and constant coordination with the several faculties of the school but also direct liaison with the other OTR schools, the OTR staffs, and non-OTR components of the Agency.

Additional services performed by the executive assistant were research and information collection to support the classroom and outside-lecturing activities of the chief of the school, maintenance of a log of office activities, and the management of the clerical personnel in the office of the chief. The executive assistant did not act for the chief during his absence; that chore was assigned to the senior faculty

25X1 chief -- [redacted] during the entire 1959-66 period.

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D. Studies in Intelligence

In September 1955 OTR published the first issue of Studies in Intelligence. <sup>17/</sup> The publication was the result of a proposal made in 1953 by Dr. Sherman Kent, at that time the chief of the Office of National Estimates. Dr. Kent believed that there was a "need for an intelligence literature" <sup>18/</sup> and recommended that OTR assume the responsibility for the project. The task was assigned to the Plans and Policy Staff; but it was not a high-priority assignment, and almost two years passed before actual publication of the first issue. An informal group composed of the DTR, the Inspector General, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Deputy Director for Plans, and other senior officers of the Agency acted as sponsors of the publication.

The first issue of Studies in Intelligence contained two articles, one by Sherman Kent on "The Need for an Intelligence Literature" and one by the "editors" on "The Current Program for an Intelligence Literature." <sup>19/</sup> There appears to be no record of the internal CIA reaction to the publication, but the DTR reported that "with the exception of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2," OTR had received comments from all of the agencies of the intelligence community to which the Studies was sent; all of the comments "warmly supported the idea of a

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scholarly journal dealing with intelligence subjects." 20/ In December 1955 the DTR reported that the Directorate of Intelligence of the Air Force had proposed to send to OTR a list of possible topics for development into articles for the Studies. 21/

The second issue of the Studies was published in January 1956.\* The entire issue was devoted to an article on "Capabilities in National Estimates" written by Abbot Smith [redacted] The third issue [redacted] appeared in May 1956 and contained the one article, "Economic Intelligence," written by Max Millikan [redacted] 25X

For some reason, apparently unrecorded in official papers, publication of the Studies was dropped after the issue of May 1956.

Early in 1957, Mr. Baird decided that the publication should be revived, 25X1 and he assigned the job to [redacted] as noted above. At that time, the Studies project was still within the Plans and Policy Staff, but when 25X1 [redacted] was appointed Deputy Chief of the Intelligence School, he took the Studies job with him. He began the revival of the publication by re-constituting the earlier informal advisory group as a "Board of Directors," with virtually the same composition -- the DTR, the

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\* Copies of all issues of Studies in Intelligence are filed in the Intelligence School vault of OTR.

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Inspector General, senior officers of the Directorates -- but with the addition of Dr. Kent, who served as chairman of the board. [redacted] 25X  
then went ahead with the solicitation of contributions to the publication; the contributions were reviewed by the members of the board, and selections were made. In late October 1957 the "Fall of 1957" issue of the Studies was published as Volume I -- a clear indication that thereafter the Studies would be somewhat different in format and content than it had been. The basic difference was that beginning with Volume I the publication had the traditional format of the scholarly journal -- several different articles on different phases of intelligence, a book review section, and a letters-to-the-editors section -- and was scheduled to be published quarterly.

25X1 [redacted] continued as Editor of the Studies until the end of

December 1957. At that time, [redacted] was brought 25X

into OTR to take over the job. For some years, [redacted] had 25X

held a senior editor position in the Foreign Documents Division of the

25X1 Office of Operations. [redacted] served as Editor of the Studies

throughout the time that the activity was a part of the Intelligence

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School and continued in the position for some years after the responsibility was transferred to the Office of the Executive Director late in 1963.\*

E. The Reading Improvement Program

Although there was in the Intelligence School from 1956 to September 1958 a Reading Improvement Faculty, the group of two instructors who constituted the "faculty" at first worked as a staff reporting to the chief of the school and later became a part of the Intelligence Production Faculty. The activities in reading training have been described in some detail in Volume I of this paper, \*\* and they have been reviewed in Volume II. \*\*\* The program is mentioned here only as a reminder that it was a function of the Intelligence School for a part of the 1956-66 period.

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\* See above, p. 13.

\*\* See OTR-5, p. 34.

\*\*\* See OTR-6, p. 107.

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#### IV. The Orientation and Briefing Officer

##### A. Background

The activities assigned to the Orientation and Briefing Officer (OBO) in June 1956 were those that had been performed by various components of OTR from the time that the Office was established. As a basis for the present discussion, the background and development of those activities will be reviewed briefly here. Perhaps it should be pointed out that in 1957, when the "groups" in the Intelligence School became faculties, the duties of the OBO were assigned to a "Special Orientation Faculty."\* Although this faculty continued to be shown on official tables of organization for some years, it was not so referred to internally, and gradually the "faculty" designation faded away entirely. There was, of course, no faculty as such; there was only the OBO and his clerical assistant.

##### 1. Organization

Very soon after OTR was established in 1951, it acquired the job of providing speakers for non-Agency groups. The OTR organization chart for July 1951 shows that within the Basic Training

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\* See OTR-6, p. 103.

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Division of TR(O) there was an Orientation and Briefing Branch,\* and the briefing activity was carried out by this branch. The December 1954 reorganization of OTR established an Orientation and Briefing Division within the Basic Training School,\*\* and that organization continued until June 1956 when the OBO became a "group" reporting directly to the Chief of the Intelligence School. Thereafter, as noted above, the OBO continued as a separate component of the school until July 1965, when the position was abolished.

2. Personnel and Facilities

Throughout the 1956-66 period, the staff of the OBO consisted of himself and one or two clerical assistants. From the beginning, of course, the briefing job was much too large for one man to handle, and [redacted] -- who was, in effect, the OBO from mid-1951 to September 1956 -- very early established the practice of calling on other OTR officers for help. [redacted] for example, was assigned to the Intelligence Training School, but actually he functioned primarily as [redacted]

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\* See OTR-5, Figure 1, p. 12.

\*\* See OTR-5, Figure 4, p. 121.

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took over as OBO in September 1956, the support was provided by members of the Intelligence Orientation Faculty -- primarily [redacted] X1 [redacted] - and by the chief of the school.

In mid-1951, when [redacted] was brought into OTR 25X by Mr. Baird to serve as the principal briefing officer, there was available to OTR no suitable facility for briefing high-level, non-Agency persons and groups. The classrooms in the temporary buildings that OTR occupied in the Potomac Park area were make-shift and uncomfortable, and because they were usually occupied by classes they could not be made available on short notice. Soon after [redacted] 25X came on board, Mr. Baird arranged to have a first-floor wing of Central Building -- in the E Street headquarters area -- reconstructed to provide office space and a small auditorium for the use of the OBO. By the end of September 1951, the reconstruction had been completed, and the OBO had moved into the space and was conducting briefing programs there.

This space, known as 117 Central, was fully equipped for projection of films and slides and for the use of various other kinds of visual aids. There was a platform stage and 86 theater-type seats arranged in curving rows on an inclined, carpeted floor. Adjacent to

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the briefing room itself there was a small lounge area with facilities for serving coffee. The OBO's office, separated from the main briefing room by the projection booth and a storage area, also served as a lounge and coffee room for small groups.

The Central Building space continued to be occupied by the OBO until OTR moved to the new Headquarters Building at Langley. Then the OBO moved to space in the Intelligence School area of the new building, space that consisted of an office area and a small conference-type briefing room.\* When OTR was moved out of Headquarters Building to the Glebe Road location, the OBO stayed at Headquarters but was moved to smaller space with only a single room that had to serve as both office and briefing room.

B. Scope of Responsibilities

During the early years of the 1956-66 period, the activities of the OBO fell into three general categories: participation in OTR and non-OTR component training courses, support of entrance-

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\* At that time, of course, the new Headquarters Auditorium was available for the briefing of groups too large to be accommodated in a conference room.

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on-duty and return-from-overseas programs, and participation in briefing programs arranged by DDP components and the DDI Liaison Staff.

Because the job of the OBO required that he be a specialist on the missions and functions of the Agency and the organization and activity of the entire intelligence community, he was usually called upon to lecture on those subjects in all of the Agency training courses in which they were covered. These courses ranged from the basic orientation course for newly recruited clerical personnel to the rather sophisticated Clandestine Services Review given by the Operations School and the Intelligence Orientation Course that was required of all professional employees of the Agency. Within the same category of classroom lecturing were several of the non-OTR component-sponsored courses given by the Offices of Communications and Security.

Naturally, the OBO himself could not meet all of the classroom participation requirements, and frequently it was necessary to call upon other Intelligence School instructors to substitute for the OBO -- usually members of the Intelligence Orientation Faculty and most often [redacted] who was thoroughly versed in the substance to be covered. During the latter years of the 1956-66 period, when the

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OBO became more deeply involved in his other duties, the classroom function was almost entirely taken over by members of the Intelligence Orientation Faculty.

The second category of OBO functions, the support of entrance-on-duty and return-from-overseas functions, involved primarily regular participation in two programs. One of these was the CIA Introduction,\* a program designed for all new employees of the Agency with the intent of providing a brief orientation to the Agency, its missions, and its organizational climate. This program was a part of the processing procedure conducted by the Office of Personnel; it was a one-day -- at times a two-day -- program held weekly or semi-weekly, depending on the entrance-on-duty rate, and it included talks by representatives of the Offices of Personnel and Security and of the Medical Staff, as well as the OBO. The second of the two programs in this category was the CIA Review.\* This program, usually a one-day seminar, was designed primarily for DDP and DDS personnel who had returned to headquarters duty from extended overseas assignments. The program was given whenever the returnee volume warranted --

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\* See OTR-6, p. 102.

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usually at least once a month. The objective was to acquaint the returnees with changes and developments in the Agency and the intelligence community that had occurred during their absence from the country. This area of coverage was, of course, the province of the OBO.

The third major category of OBO functions, the support of briefing programs organized by DDP components and the DDI Liaison Staff, was an on-call service, so to speak. The OBO, often on very short notice, would be asked to participate in the briefing of an individual or a group. Usually he was expected to provide the mission-organization-function portion of the overall briefing, and he was expected to participate in the informal question-and-answer session that always followed such briefings. Of all of the duties of the OBO, this was the most difficult and the most demanding. Because the people to be briefed were usually very important officers or officials of the US Government or of a friendly foreign government, these briefings had the highest priority. Because the background, knowledge, and experience varied with each person and group, the OBO had to tailor his presentation for each briefing. Because there was such a variance in the need-to-know qualifications of the people briefed, the

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degree-of-revelation aspect of each briefing had to be carefully determined. An additional troublesome factor -- one that was eventually eliminated -- was the multiplicity of channels through which briefings were arranged and the consequent confusing lack of coordination.

C. Expansion of Activities

Basically, the responsibilities of the OBO remained the same throughout the 1956-66 period, but there was a general expansion in the scope of one of the three major categories of OBO duties. The level of support required for OTR and component training courses and for the entrance-on-duty and return-from-overseas programs stayed about the same. Because of the expansion of his other responsibility, however, the OBO had to turn most of the classroom and internal briefing tasks over to other OTR instructors. Whenever possible, he did continue to do the mission-and-function and intelligence community lectures for the more advanced courses -- the JOT program, the Intelligence Review, and the Clandestine Services Review. The OBO's third major responsibility, participation in what came to be called VIP briefings, expanded in two directions.

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1. Non-Government Briefings

First, in 1962 the Executive Director\* began to depend more and more on the OBO for the handling of briefings requested by non-government groups. It was the Executive Director, often in conference with the DCI, who decided which outside requests should be accepted. The bases for acceptance varied -- from enhancement of the public image of the Agency to the accommodation of a senator, a representative, or some other influential person. Once accepted, the request was turned over to the OBO, who either did the briefing himself or arranged for someone else to do it -- depending upon the requirements of each request.

Most such briefings were unclassified discussions of the Agency's role in the US Government, usually followed by a question-and-answer period. They were rather sticky assignments that no one wanted very much; there was always the danger that one of the speaker's statements might be distorted or taken out of context and so reported by the press. But the jobs had to be done, and most frequently they

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\* The position of Executive Director was established in April 1962. In November 1963 the title was changed to Executive Director-Comptroller.

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were done either by the OBO himself or by the Chief of the Intelligence School. Illustrative of the kinds of groups involved in this non-government briefing activity is a partial list of the organizations briefed by the chief of the school. 22/ Not all of these were briefed before the end of 1965, but the list will serve to indicate the nature of the job. Included are the Association of Military Chaplains' Wives; the Gaithersburg Rotary Club; the Landon School for Boys; the Essex, New Jersey, Catholic High School; the US Merchant Marine Academy Alumni Association; the Moravian College Seminar; and the New London County, Connecticut, Medical Auxiliary.

Needless to say, these groups, and a great many more like them, were briefed for good and sufficient reason. The Essex Catholic High School group, for example, was taking the traditional tour of Washington, and the New Jersey congressman from the Essex district requested the Agency to give the group a briefing in the main dining room of the Mayflower Hotel; the congressman was a member of an influential House committee, and his request was granted. The New London County Medical Auxiliary was briefed in an attempt to repair some local damage to the Agency's image caused by the cancellation of a CIA recruiter's visit to the Connecticut College for

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Women, located in New London. The students had threatened to demonstrate against the recruiter's visit, college authorities warned the Agency, and the visit was canceled; there followed in the student newspaper a bitter protest against the Agency's cancellation -- the logic of protesting first the visit and then the cancellation of the visit is a bit questionable, but that's probably irrelevant. When the Medical Auxiliary's request for an Agency speaker came to the Agency through the

25X1 [redacted] the Executive Director-

Comptroller approved it; and [redacted] then Chief of the Intelligence School, was sent to make whatever repairs to the Agency's image were possible.

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2. VIP Briefings

The second area of major expansion in the responsibilities of the OBO was that of briefing high-level US Government officials and those of friendly foreign powers. As noted above, briefings of this type were arranged by the various Country Desks of the DDP Area Divisions and by the DDI Liaison Staff. All too often there was little or no coordination of arrangements, and the OBO frequently found that

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either he was expected to be in two or more places at the same time or scheduled briefings had been rescheduled or canceled without his knowledge.

During the early years of the 1956-66 period, the briefings of newly appointed ambassadors and consular personnel were arranged, at the request of the Department of State, by the ADDP Area Division Country Desks that had overseas stations in the country to which the appointee was going. The briefings of senior military personnel were usually arranged with the Department of Defense by the DDI Liaison Staff. There was at that time no central point of coordination, and not only the OBO but also senior Agency officials -- including the DCI -- were often confused. Obviously, there was a need for revision of the scheduling procedures.

As early as June 1959 [redacted] the OBO at the time, 25X1 met with [redacted] a senior DDP officer, to discuss the problem, 23/ and a partial solution was reached. It was agreed that Mr. 25X1 [redacted] would take over the intra-Agency coordination of briefings for "designated chiefs of Missions and Military Commanders." This meant that the OBO would make all internal arrangements with the Office of the DCI and the Directorates concerned and thus eliminate a

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greater part of the confusion. The arrangement was an informal one, but it worked; it did, however, leave the initial arrangements with State and Defense in the hands of the country desks and the liaison staff.

In May 1962 this problem was solved when [redacted]

25X

met with Mr. Thomas Karamessines, then Deputy DDP, 24/ and worked out an arrangement whereby the OBO would coordinate initial arrangements for the VIP briefings directly with the chiefs of the DDP Staffs and Area Divisions. This system proved to be an effective one. It permitted the Area Divisions to continue their direct contacts with State in matters of briefing newly appointed chiefs of mission, and it centralized coordination of all Agency components involved in the briefings.

D. Examples of OBO Activities

The foregoing description of the OBO's duties and responsibilities is, of course, only summary in nature. It omits mention of many peripheral activities of the OBO, and it gives only a few specific examples. Perhaps a better understanding of the OBO's job can be conveyed by further explication -- mention of the peripheral activities and some specific quantitative measure of the major functions of the job.

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One of the phases of the OBO's service to the Executive Director-Comptroller was the coordination of arrangements for groups, both government and non-government, that visited the Agency for briefing. Before the completion of the new Headquarters Building at Langley, these groups came to 117 Central; later, of course, they came to the Headquarters Auditorium or to one of the large conference rooms in the new building. The visits usually involved temporary security clearances, and they always involved arrangement for transportation and refreshment. The OBO provided the Office of Security with lists of names and arranged for the badging of visitors, provided building escorts, and arranged for Agency transportation when that was feasible and for public transportation when that was necessary. In addition, he arranged the entire briefing program for the groups and made arrangements with all of the speakers involved. In this capacity, he acted not only as a briefer but also as a security officer and a logistics officer.

Another occasional chore that fell to the lot of the OBO was that of representing the Executive Director-Comptroller or the Director at meetings that they could not attend. Such representation was limited, of course, to situations that did not really require the presence of a senior Agency executive; when protocol dictated, the DDCI

would represent the DCI, and one of the Deputy Directors would represent the Executive Director-Comptroller. In other situations, however, the OBO was sometimes asked to substitute.

In March 1961, for example, the DCI, then Mr. Dulles, was asked to appear in Boston at a ceremony commemorating the Armenian Independence Day and receive a "Freedom Award." Other commitments prevented his attendance, and the Chief of the Office of Operations -- through whom the request had been forwarded from the [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]  
report of the affair, he had drafted the Dulles letter, and it had been "properly emasculated by Colonel Grogan" before Mr. Dulles signed it.\*

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\* Col. Stanley Grogan was the Assistant to the Director for Public Affairs at the time, and regulations required that all public releases or utterances be approved by him. He was an ardent disciple of the "tell-em-nothing" doctrine; hence, [redacted] lament.

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The drafting of the Dulles letter was just one of many ghost-  
25X1 ing jobs that [redacted] did for the Executive Director- Comptroller  
and the DCI. For example, in March 1961 [redacted] reported that  
"a twenty-minute presentation on intelligence is being drafted for the  
use of Mr. Dulles, who will participate . . . in an on-the-record dis-  
cussion of intelligence and policy . . . before representatives of all  
mass media. Participating with Mr. Dulles will be Secretaries Rusk  
and McNamara. The President will preside." 27/ There appears to  
be no subsequent report of emasculation by Col. Grogan or, for that  
matter, of Mr. Dulles having used [redacted] draft.

Some quantitative and qualitative measure of the OBO's par-  
ticipation in VIP briefings can be indicated by excerpts from his weekly  
activity reports to the Chief of the Intelligence School. In March 1961,  
for example, he briefed -- among many lesser lights -- Mr. Raymond  
Hare, Ambassador to Turkey; Lieut. Gen. James M. Gavin, Ambas-  
sador to France; Mr. A. J. Drexel Biddle, Ambassador to Spain;  
Mr. Clifton R. Wharton, Ambassador to Norway; and Dr. J. Kenneth  
Galbraith, Ambassador to India. In June and July of the same year,  
his briefings included five additional ambassadors; Mr. Stephen Smith,  
Special Assistant to the Director of the State Department Special

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Operations Center; and such senior military officers as Maj. Gen. H. B. Thatcher, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Command in Korea, Maj. Gen. Edwin J. Messinger, Chief of the Joint U. S. Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, and Lieut. Gen. Jacob E. Smart, Commander of the Fifth Air Force and Commander of U. S. Forces, Japan.

25X

As noted above, one of the OBO's responsibilities was briefing, or arranging briefings for, State Department training courses and those of the many military schools. The State Department courses were given by, or sponsored by, the Foreign Service Institute. The military schools included the National War College, the Industrial

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College of the Armed Forces, the Naval War College, the Air War College, the Armed Forces Staff College, the Army Command and General Staff School, the Army Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence School, the Army Counterintelligence School at Fort Holabird, the Army Civil Affairs School at Fort Gordon, the Special Center at Fort Bragg, the Infantry School at Fort Benning, and the Armor School at Fort Knox.

E. Elimination of the OBO Position

As noted earlier,\* the Orientation and Briefing Officer position was eliminated in July of 1965, and the duties and responsibilities were absorbed by the Intelligence Orientation Faculty,\*\* which was then re-designated the Orientation and Briefing Faculty (OBF).

Although the scope of briefing activities did not in any way diminish at the time, procedures had been established and effective channels of coordination had been developed. The chief of the OBF, then Mr.

25X1 [redacted] acted as the senior briefing officer, and several members of the faculty -- notably [redacted] and Dr.

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\* P. 13, above.

\*\* This change was made primarily for economy. [redacted] resigned from the Agency, and the slot was not filled.

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25X1 [redacted] - served as supporting briefers; the chief of the school continued his briefing activities, principally for the military schools and non-government groups.

It is the opinion of the officer who was Chief of the Intelligence School at that time that the elimination of the OBO position was not a wise move. 28/ It resulted in a conflict of priorities within the OBF, and it put the chief of the faculty in the untenable position of often being forced to sacrifice the teaching programs of the faculty in order to meet briefing requirements levied by high officials of the Agency.. It was not uncommon for the continuity of a training course to be interrupted by the sudden withdrawal of the chief instructor to meet a high-priority briefing requirement. There was, of course, a degree of instructor exchangeability in the faculty; but it was not always possible to make last-minute changes, and sometimes course schedules had to be revised because there was no qualified instructor available to fill in.

In any event, the work of the Orientation and Briefing Officer was one of the major activities of the Intelligence School throughout most of the 1956-66 period. It provided the Agency with a necessary service, and that service was performed in a highly professional manner.

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V. The Intelligence Orientation Faculty

A. Mission and Staff

That part of the Intelligence School mission described by Mr. Baird in 1956 as "orientation to the intelligence process and to clandestine activity" \* became the responsibility of the Intelligence Orientation Faculty (IOF) of the school. Mr. Baird's statement was, of course, both over-capsulized and ambiguous. Actually, the mission of the faculty was to conduct orientation programs related to the nature of intelligence, its uses in the US Government, the total national intelligence effort, the role that CIA played in this effort, and the structure and function that CIA had developed in order to meet its responsibilities in the total intelligence effort. In other words, the mission was broad in scope; orientation to the "intelligence process and to clandestine activity" was only a small part of it. The ambiguity lay in the fact that as far as the intelligence process as such was concerned, it was the province of the Intelligence Production Faculty of the Intelligence School; and the clandestine activity as such was the province of the

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\* See above, p. 7.

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Operations School. The following discussion of the activities of the IOF during the 1956-66 period will more clearly define the nature of the faculty's mission.

When the IOF came into being in 1957, the chief of the faculty

25X1 was [redacted] who had been the chief instructor in the

intelligence orientation group at the time that the school was estab-

lished in June 1956.\* In 1957 his staff consisted of [redacted] instructors

and two clerical assistants. Thereafter, the number of instructors

varied from time to time -- from as many as [redacted]

depending on the factors of requirements and availability of instructors.

The major programs conducted by [redacted] -- and his successor,

25X1 [redacted] -- and the IOF instructors during the 1956-66 period were

the Intelligence Orientation Course, the Intelligence Products Exhibit,

the Intelligence Review Course, and the development of the Midcareer

Course. In addition, there were a number of special activities related

to orientation. The major programs and the special activities are

described in the following paragraphs.

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\* See above, p. 17.

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B. The Intelligence Orientation Course

In terms of the faculty's total time and manpower, the Intelligence Orientation Course was by far the greatest consumer. Because an Agency regulation made the course mandatory for all professional employees and because the regulation was retroactive, the accommodation of newly on-board personnel coupled with the catch-up requirement for personnel who had not taken the course when they had come on board earlier made it necessary to offer the course for fairly large groups at least six times a year. The importance of the IOC in the overall OTR program warrants some detailed description of it here.

1. Background

The antecedents of the IOC can be traced back to the very early years of the Agency. The records show that on 2 August 1948 the twelfth running of the Basic Intelligence Training Course (BITC) was started. 29/ There appears to be no record of the first eleven runnings; obviously, the course must have started in 1947 and must have been given fairly frequently thereafter. On 6 September 1949 the BITC was replaced by the Intelligence Orientation Course (IOC), which had four runnings before it was replaced by the Staff Orientation Course (SOC) on 9 January 1950. The name of the SOC was

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changed to the Basic Orientation Course (BOC) on 28 May 1951, but the course itself continued until 27 February 1953. At that time, the course was split into two courses, one called Basic Intelligence Course, Intelligence (BIC-I) and the other Basic Intelligence Course, Clandestine Services (BIC-CS). This two-course system continued through eleven runnings of each course until 1 November 1954, when the two were combined as the Basic Orientation Course (BOC). The BOC continued for nineteen runnings until 4 September 1956, when it was replaced by the Intelligence Orientation Course.

2. Purpose and Content

From the very beginning of the course in 1947, its major objective was to acquaint professional people who come into the Agency with little or no experience in intelligence with the nature and purpose of intelligence, with the ways in which it is collected and used, with the Agency's responsibilities, and with the Agency's organizational structure. The rationale behind making the IOC mandatory not only for new-on-board professionals but also for all professionals in the Agency who had not taken the course was that most of the older hands

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knew little about the Agency as a whole or about the US intelligence community; they tended to be rutted in their own jobs and, consequently, parochial in their outlook.

Although the IOC was constantly being revised and improved during the 1956-66 period, the substantive content remained about the same. There was a block of instruction on the nature and significance of intelligence and its uses in support of national policy; a block on the total US intelligence effort, covering the members of the intelligence community and their functions; a block on the overall responsibilities of the Agency; and a series of blocks on the collection, production, dissemination, and support activities of the Agency. The sequence of the various blocks of instruction varied from time to time, as did the organization of the material within the blocks. At times, for example, the Agency's functions would be presented as Agency-wide, cross-Directorate procedures; at other times they would be presented within the context of the functions of the various Directorates and Offices within the Directorates.

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### 3. Methods of Instruction

Very early in the development of the predecessors of the IOC, it was learned that orientation instruction could become appallingly dull if it consisted of an uninterrupted series of guest lecturers. Guest lecturers, of course, were necessary; the effectiveness of the instruction depended primarily on the authenticity behind the material presented, and only the people who actually did the work in the offices and in the field could provide that authenticity. The IOC instructional staff could -- and always did -- provide some of the necessary substantive expertise, but they could not -- and did not -- pretend full competence in all fields of intelligence.

The basic method of instruction, then, was the guest lecture; but these were spaced, and various other kinds of learning activity came between them -- seminars, class discussions, readings, films, displays, and demonstrations. Throughout the period the individual classes were large -- usually from 40 to 80 students -- and the instructors few. The seminar activity often required the borrowing of instructors from other faculties of the school, and testing and evaluation procedures had to be developed so that they could be performed by the few instructors available.

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Early in the 1956-66 period a new element was introduced into the IOC -- the American Thesis, as it was called. This consisted of a block of time, sometimes concentrated in a single day and sometimes spread through the course in segments, devoted to the discussion of American values and tenets and the internal forces and alien ideologies that might threaten them. Usually, one of the IOC instructors presented the subject to the entire class, defining terms, setting parameters, and suggesting specific areas for exploration. Background reading material was provided, and time for study was provided. The class then divided into seminar groups, each with a student discussion leader and a specific question for discussion. An instructor met with each group to suggest methods of approach and, if necessary, to stimulate discussion. This American Thesis element not only gave the students an opportunity for active participation but it also tended to give meaning and immediacy to the strategic aspects of intelligence.

#### 4. Supplemental Activities

In addition to the scheduled class activities of the IOC, there were supplemental activities, largely optional, provided for the students. In June 1958, for example, [redacted] and his staff

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introduced a weekly series of current intelligence briefings for the students of the IOC and other Agency personnel who wished to attend.

30/ The Office of Current Intelligence provided the briefer, who usually spoke for about 30 minutes on a subject of current intelligence interest. In 1958 a series of noon-time movies was introduced. 31/ These films were various kinds of documentaries on different world areas and covered a wide range of subjects -- geographic, military, political, economic, and ethnological. Both the current intelligence briefings and the noon-time movies were held in the auditorium of the Recreation and Services Building, but both were abandoned when OTR moved to the new Headquarters Building in Langley. Another supplemental activity was the Intelligence Products Exhibit, which began as an IOC-related project but later developed into a major activity of Agency-wide importance. That project is described in some detail below.

5. The Written Version

There was one activity related to the IOC that must be mentioned in spite of the fact that it was extremely costly in terms of manpower and utterly useless in terms of training. This was the attempt to reduce the substantive content of the IOC to written form.

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The project had its origin in a casual conversation between Mr. Baird and a young DDP officer who had just completed the IOC after being in the Agency for a few years.\* Commenting on the course, the DDP officer remarked that as far as the content was concerned, he could have gotten all of it in a few hours of reading if the material for reading had been available. Mr. Baird concluded that the young man had a point and directed the Chief of the Intelligence School to start the project of committing all of the IOC lecture material to writing, combining with it the collateral reading assigned in the course, and finally producing a package that would contain the complete substance of the IOC. It was never quite clear whether or not Mr. Baird had in mind the eventual elimination of the IOC as a class and the substitution of the IOC written package. He did believe, however, that the package would be useful to individuals who, for some reason, could not enroll in the course itself and to special groups of employees located outside the headquarters area.

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\* This account is based on the recollections of an OTR officer who was deeply involved in the project. 32/

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The chief of the school objected to the initiation of the project. He admitted that the idea was good in theory, but he was convinced that it was completely impracticable; and he stated his reasons for his conviction. His objections were overruled, however, and the project was initiated with the understanding that it would be a part-time job for several instructors of the Intelligence Orientation Faculty. On the surface, the task was a simple one. Most of the lectures given in the IOC had been recorded on tape, and those that had not could easily be recorded; the tapes would be transcribed by the typists; the transcriptions would be edited by the IOC instructors; the edited texts would be typed and submitted for coordination and approval to the Office, Staff, or Division that the individual speakers represented; after approval, the papers would be reproduced in quantity, combined with the collateral reading, and made available for use.

The first, and most obvious, problem inherent in this apparently simple procedure was the availability of time. The transcription of tapes, the editing of the transcriptions, and the retyping of edited copy were long and tedious tasks that progressed very slowly when done as a part-time activity. It was soon apparent that additional help, both clerical and professional, would be necessary if any

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real progress was to be made. The additional clerical help was obtained by borrowing typists from other components and by using newly cleared clerical employees awaiting permanent assignments.

Professional help was obtained through an arrangement made by the chief of the school with the Office of Research and Reports; a senior

25X1 ORR officer, [redacted] was detailed to OTR for a one-year period. With the additional help, the project went forward -- up to a point.

That point was the approval of the edited manuscripts by the components from which the original speakers had come. That proved to be almost impossible. Between the time of the original lecture and the time the edited manuscript was completed, organizations had changed, personnel had changed, doctrine had changed, and methods and procedures had changed. Some components made the effort to correct and update the manuscripts; but that required time, and obsolescence invariably overtook the effort. The result was a stalemate, and after about two years of work and the departure of Mr.

25X1 [redacted] the project was allowed to fade out quietly and the IOC continued as a classroom program.

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#### 6. The JOTP Version

Until late in 1958 the Junior Officer Trainees received their training along with other Agency professionals in the regularly scheduled OTR courses. In 1958 the decision was made to establish separate courses for the JOT's\* and one of these was the JOT version of the IOC. The first of the special courses was given in September 1958; 33/ it contained an element called the American Outlook. In describing the new version of the IOC, the Chief of the Intelligence School stated that it was "designed to meet the special requirements of the new JOT Program. American Outlook is an expansion of the American Thesis, emphasizing the ideals of the American System, intelligence in the formulation of Foreign Policy, and the world-wide problems of the U.S." 34/

Basically, the content of the JOT version of the IOC was the same as that of the regular course, and the duration of the course -- two weeks -- remained the same. The American Outlook section was, however, quite different from the American Thesis part of the regular course. The concept of the American Outlook had been

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\* The details of the "integration" of the JOT Program are covered in a separate historical paper.

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25X1 developed by [redacted] who was chief of the school at the time, and he personally took over the management of that part of the IOC. His theory was that because the JOTs were carefully selected young people with test-proven capabilities of high order, they should be exposed to a much more sophisticated study of the American way of life than was provided by the American Thesis element of the regular 25X1 IOC. [redacted] plan was to bring in as speakers for the American Outlook program outstanding substantive specialists from the academic world and from government -- primarily the foreign service of the State Department. 35/

At the very outset, [redacted] ran into trouble. His first choice of a high-level visiting lecturer was a notorious professor of political science in one of the major eastern US universities. It developed, however, that the Agency's Office of Security -- for some reason not specified -- would not grant temporary clearance for the professor. Some of the other high-level speakers proposed were not acceptable because they had publicly adopted political postures that were offensive to some members of the Congress or to officials of the national administration. Some of the speakers who were acceptable declined the invitation to speak; even in 1958 some academic people

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were wary of the CIA taint. In short, the American Outlook feature of the JOT version of the IOC failed to work out; and after the initial attempt in September of 1958, the American Outlook reverted to the American Thesis. The course itself, however, continued throughout the 1956-66 period as one of the major parts of the JOT training program.

C. The Intelligence Products Exhibit


An exhibit of finished intelligence publications had always been a part of the orientation course, beginning with the Basic Orientation Course, as the program was called before September 1956, 36/ and continuing into the IOC. Before March of 1968, this exhibit consisted of table displays in the IOC classroom, and it was intended to supplement that part of the course that covered the intelligence production activities of the Agency. Because it proved to be of great interest both to the IOC students and the Agency components that supplied the display material, [redacted] and his staff decided to expand the scope of the exhibit. To do this it was necessary to set aside a full day during the running of each IOC so that the exhibit materials could be assembled in the R&S Building auditorium -- then the IOC classroom.

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The Agency components from which the exhibit materials came were invited to send representatives to explain the materials. From the beginning, the exhibit proved to be successful, and it attracted personnel from all parts of the Agency. After the first of the new exhibit programs, in March 1958, it was decided to invite personnel from other agencies in the intelligence community -- then known as the IAC (Intelligence Advisory Committee) agencies and later designated the USIB (United States Intelligence Board) agencies. The IAC agencies responded to the invitation, and by the end of August 1958 the exhibit had been presented five times and 224 people from other IAC agencies had visited it. 37/

By that time, the content of the exhibit had expanded to include not only finished intelligence publications but also a wide range of intelligence materials in the collection and processing stages. For example, the Office of Central Reference had a display covering information processing, storage, and retrieval;



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The success of the Intelligence Products Exhibit led to the introduction of a Support Exhibit late in 1958. This was similar to the products exhibit, but the displays were provided by the Office of the Support Directorate and attendance was limited to Agency personnel. The support exhibit was designed primarily to supplement the IOC coverage of the Agency's support activities, but like the products exhibit, it attracted people from all parts of the Agency. In fiscal year 1959, the support exhibit was given six times and was attended by 650 people. 38/ In calendar year 1960, it was given only twice for about 200 people, 39/ and thereafter it was discontinued because of the apparent lack of interest.\*

The Intelligence Products Exhibit, however, continued and was well attended. In fiscal year 1959, for example, it was given about six times and attended by 1,300 people, about 600 of them from other USIB agencies; 41/ and attendance continued at about that level through the last exhibit to be given in the R&S auditorium -- on 22 March 1962. 42/ After OTR moved to the new Headquarters Building the products exhibit was given only twice, both times in room 1A-07

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\* In October 1961, however, an Office of Communications exhibit was held in the R&S auditorium as a part of the IOC. 40/

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of the new building. The first was attended by only 77 people, both Agency and other USIB; the second was held, at the request of the Executive Director of the Agency, for the staff and student body of the National War College, and a total of 200 people attended. 43/ Thereafter, largely because of the lack of availability of suitable space for the exhibit, it was dropped as a major activity and reverted to the classroom table display as a part of the IOC.

D. The Intelligence Review

25X1 Early in 1960 Dr. [redacted] and his staff conducted an unofficial "market survey" in the various components of the DDI to determine whether or not there was a need for a mid-career level course to serve as a refresher for DDI analysts. Since November 1954 the Operations School had been giving a course called the Clandestine Services Review (CSR).\* Although the rationale of the CSR was based on the need to reorient CS officers who had returned from overseas assignments,

25X1 [redacted] group felt that there might be a similar need to reorient DDI analysts who had, by the nature of their highly specialized jobs, lost touch with Agency-wide and intelligence community activities.

\* See OTR-6, p. 135.

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The "market survey" tended to show that there was a definite need for such a course, and the IOF went ahead with the planning and the coordination of content. The general purpose of the course, as it was first determined, was to provide a review of developments in the Agency and in the intelligence community; to identify and describe trends in the uses of intelligence; and to discuss the problems that might face the intelligence profession in the future. Although the emphasis was to be on the production and application aspects of intelligence, there was to be some coverage of the activities of the clandestine services of the Agency. The instructional methods were to include lectures, panels, seminars, and discussion groups. The speakers were to be high-level Agency officials, including the Deputy Directors, the Inspector General, and the DCI or the DDCI. The students were to be DDI analysts at the GS-13 and GS-14 levels with at least five years of Agency experience.

The first official mention of the Intelligence Review (IR) course was made in the OTR narrative justification for the budget estimate that was submitted to the DDS by the DTR in August 1960. That contained a statement that "the Intelligence Orientation Faculty developed . . . a program for a one-week Intelligence Review Course

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to begin in the fall, 1960." The OTR Bulletin dated September-November 1960 carried the announcement that "recently OTR added the Intelligence Review as a refresher for mid-careerists of the DDI and the DDS primarily." The announcement stated that the course was for officers at or above the GS-12 level and that it would run for two weeks, in the mornings, in the R&S auditorium. Apparently the original plans had changed to the extent that the minimum grade level was lowered to GS-12, DDS officers were eligible for the course, and the course was to run part-time for two weeks instead of full-time for one week.

The first Intelligence Review course was held in October 1960 for 38 students, 26 from the DDI, 10 from the DDS, and 2 from the DDP. 44/ It ran for two weeks, in the mornings. The part-time schedule was used on the theory that students would prefer to continue, at least in part, their regular jobs while taking the course. After the October running, the student critiques of the course were studied carefully, and [redacted] discussed them with DDI supervisory personnel. The conclusions reached were that the part-time arrangement was not necessary and that 40 hours did not permit the depth of coverage that the students needed. The January-February 1961 OTR Bulletin announced that the second running of the IR course would cover a

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two-week period beginning 3 April 1961 and that attendance would be full time, a total of 80 hours. The same announcement stated that either the IR or the CSR was "recommended for all Agency personnel who plan to attend one of the senior officer courses -- the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Army War College . . . etc."

The second running of the IR proved to be a complete success and established the pattern that the course was to follow for several years to come. In commenting on intelligence training activities during fiscal year 1961, Mr. Baird reported that "the most significant achievement . . . was the establishment of the Intelligence Review course." 45/ The third running of the IR was held in October 1961, retaining the full-time, two-week schedule, and thereafter the course was run twice each year throughout the remainder of the 1956-66 period.

Although the basic structure and content of the IR remained the same after the second running of the course, the area of substantive emphasis, the instructional methods, and the student composition of the class went through a continuing process of change. Gradually, greater stress was placed on the policy-support aspects of intelligence

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and on the problems posed by international developments; greater use was made of the seminar and panel-discussion kinds of activity and of non-Agency speakers; and finally the "primarily DDI" concept of the class composition was phased out, and by 1965 the classes were composed of officers from all Directorates of the Agency -- including the DDP. Even before that time, the IR had acquired an Agency-wide reputation as a highly professional, high-level program that was almost essential to career development in the Agency.

During the first four runnings of the IR, [redacted] served

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as chief instructor of the course, with [redacted] as his

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25X1 assistant. In 1962 transferred from the Office

of Current Intelligence to the Intelligence School of OTR, and he

became chief instructor for the October 1962 course and for all sub-

became chief instructor for the October 1962 course and for all subsequent courses.

25x1 sequent runnings. I [redacted] deserve plaudits

for the planning and development of the course itself and

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for the sophisticated refinement that the course ultimately achieved.

In retrospect, it would seem that if Mr. Baird's characterization of

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the course as the "most significant achievement" of fiscal year 1961 had been qualified by the phrase "one of the" it would have been an appropriate characterization of the IR throughout the 1956-66 period.\*

E. The Midcareer Course and Program

Another achievement of major significance during the period was the development of the Midcareer Course. Actually, when the Midcareer Course came into being it was no longer an Intelligence School responsibility; but because the course was conceived, planned, and developed to its finished form by the Intelligence School, it is discussed in this chapter. Because the Midcareer Course was a part -- the only viable part -- of the Midcareer Training Program, it is impossible to discuss the course without discussing the program. Consequently, both the course and the program are covered here.

Although there appear to be no official documents recording the origin of the concept of a CIA midcareer course, the memory of the officer who was chief of the school at the time, 46/ supplemented

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\* The final running of the IR was in April 1969. Thereafter, beginning in the fall of 1969, the course became the Advanced Intelligence Seminar, a course with the same basic purpose as the IR but with major changes in the format and areas of emphasis. Dr. [redacted]

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[redacted] continued as chief instructor.

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25X1 by that of [redacted] the officer who became "Coordinator, Mid-Career Training," 47/ can be relied upon for the general background. One of the continuing responsibilities of the Intelligence School was that of keeping abreast of training trends outside the Agency and outside the government. In 1959 the trend in business and industry toward establishing training programs at the midcareer level became apparent, and the school initiated an informal project to develop a mid-career program for the Agency. Because the general nature of mid-career training was orientation or reorientation, the project was assigned to the Intelligence Orientation Faculty of the school. Because

25X1 [redacted] who had had considerable academic training and some Agency experience in personnel administration, was keenly interested in midcareer training, he was assigned as project officer. The DTR, Mr. Baird, encouraged the school's efforts at the beginning of the project, and thereafter he continued to give it his full support.

Early in 1959 the Department of State had developed a mid-career training program, and arrangements were made to allow Mr.

25X1 [redacted] to take the State course, which he did. By August 1959 Mr. [redacted] had completed a tentative plan for a midcareer training course and had submitted a proposal that the course be established. The first

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official mention of the course appeared in an OTR narrative justification of a budget request for fiscal year 1960; that document contained the statement that "an Intelligence Orientation instructor, who completed the State Department Mid-Career Course, developed and submitted a proposal for an Agency Mid-Career Course." 48/ No immediate action was taken on [redacted] proposal, but the project was kept alive and was broadened to include the concept of a career-development program at the midcareer level.

In June 1961 Mr. Baird announced that "inauguration of a six-to seven-week Mid-Career Course is expected" during fiscal year 1962. 49/ Also in June 1961 Mr. Baird sent to the members of the Agency Career Development Board\* a memorandum outlining his concept of a midcareer development program and a six weeks' midcareer course that would be the "core" of the program. \*\* 50/ The memorandum first discussed the philosophy of midcareer training, outlined the

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\* This board had been variously called the CIA Career Service Board, the CIA Career Council, and the Career Training Board. See OTR-7.

\*\* The memorandum had been drafted by [redacted] of course, after he had discussed the details with Mr. Baird.

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concept of a midcareer training program, and described in some detail the content of the course that would be the "six weeks' core" of the program.

Apparently the members of the Career Development Board were slow in responding to Mr. Baird's memorandum, for there was no further action on the matter until July 1962. In the meantime, however, [redacted] continued to work on the project, and in March of 1962 he analyzed a report of a November 1961 conference at Princeton University on "Federal Agency Career Development." His analysis was submitted to the DTR by [redacted] in his capacity as "Coordinator, Mid-Career Training," and it suggested some additional guidelines for the planned Agency midcareer program. 51/ By July 1962 Mr. Baird had heard enough unofficial feed-back from the members of the Career Development Board to go ahead with the midcareer project. On 9 July, he sent to Col. Lawrence K. White, the DDS, a memorandum outlining two specific training programs and suggested that either one or the other should be adopted. \* 52/ One of the programs called

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\* Both of these programs included senior-level as well as midcareer training. This marked the first official mention of a "senior executive training program" -- a concept that as of December of 1970 had not yet materialized.

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for the long-term detachment of the trainee from his regular duties and full-time assignment to training programs; the other program called for three shorter full-time periods spaced over a few years.

On 2 August 1962 Mr. Baird's 9 July memorandum was forwarded from the DDS to the Executive Director, and on 25 October -- undoubtedly after considerable informal coordination with Mr. Baird\* -- the Executive Director issued an Action Memorandum in which he expressed preference for the three-phase program suggested by Mr. Baird and requested that "DDS/OTR now prepare the final proposals and the implementing notices and regulations, which will be considered at the Executive Committee level prior to issuance." 53/ Before Mr. Baird could come up with "final proposals and the implementing notices and regulations," he had to establish some measure of agreement among the members of the CIA Training Board. On 18 December 1962 he sent to the members of the board a three-page memorandum outlining the problem and asking for their comments and suggestions. 54/

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\* Mr. Baird and Mr. Kirkpatrick, the Executive Director, were close personal friends; and many OTR problems were ironed out informally -- sometimes to the embarrassment of Col. White the DDS, with whom Mr. Baird was less friendly, and -- of course -- to the consequent embarrassment of Mr. Baird at being reprimanded by Col. White for skipping channels.

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Thereafter, progress was rapid. In March 1963 a headquarters notice, signed by Marshall S. Carter, Lieutenant General USA, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, established the "CIA Midcareer Training Program" and stated that the "Midcareer Course" was a mandatory part of the program.\* 55/ On 9 May the DTR sent to the Executive Director a tentative schedule for the midcareer course -- essentially the same schedule that had been proposed in the DTR's 26 June 1961 memorandum to the members of the Career Development Board -- and asked for his comments. On 11 June the Executive Director replied; he raised a question about one part of the schedule that called for "segregated seminars" that would group together the students from each of the Directorates -- he objected to the possible encouragement of parochialism; but he approved the schedule in general and told Mr. Baird to go ahead with the first running of the course. 56/

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\* Although there is no official record of the action, the "senior executive training" aspect of the program had been dropped, with the understanding that it would be developed at some time in the future.

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Meanwhile, the forces of administrative expediency had been 25X1 at work. In January 1963 [redacted] -- who had been from the beginning the designer and builder of both the midcareer course and the mid-career program and had been officially designated Coordinator of Mid-career Training -- had entered the four-month Harvard University Program for Management Development. He had been sent to the Harvard course to give him further preparation for the responsibility that he was to assume as officer in charge of midcareer training in the Agency. When he returned from Harvard early in May, he was informed by the Chief of the Intelligence School, then [redacted] 25X1 that [redacted] had been put in charge of the midcareer 25X1 course and that he, [redacted] would serve as [redacted] assistant.\* 25X1 [redacted] a GS-15 officer from the Africa Division of the DDP, had come to OTR as Chief of the Plans and Policy Staff in January 1962, succeeding [redacted], who had been assigned to an overseas tour of duty in a DDP war plans assignment. This exchange

\* There is, of course, no official record of the rationale behind this move; the unofficial explanation given in the following paragraphs is supplied by [redacted] who was -- in his own words -- "a co-victim" of the action.

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was one of the many "quid-pro-quo" arrangements that Mr. Baird frequently made in order to give OTR officers experience in the field.\*

25X1 [redacted] found the staff job a very tedious one without any real substantive content and without any real challenge to his capabilities. He made no secret of his discontent, and Mr. Baird was well aware of it.

By early 1963 the situation had deteriorated to the point where Mr. Baird felt that he had to do something about it in order to maintain the effectiveness of the Plans and Policy Staff. His agreement with the

25X1 DDP required that he keep [redacted] for at least two years, so the only solution was to assign him to another OTR program. [redacted] 25X temperament made it impossible to assign him to a position subordinate to any one of the OTR school or staff chiefs; he would not have accepted such an assignment.

At that time the midcareer training program was about to be approved and officially brought into being as an Intelligence School project with [redacted] as coordinator and chief instructor. The situation 25X1 provided the solution to Mr. Baird's problem. The program, which actually consisted of only the midcareer course, could be established

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\* See OTR-7.

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as a separate, non-school activity with a chief -- or "Chairman" as  
the chief was first called -- reporting directly to the DTR. Mr. Baird  
took this action in two stages. First, he designated [redacted] chief  
of the midcareer course, which made the course a project of the Plans  
25X1 and Policy Staff, of which [redacted] was still chief. In October 1963  
-- after the first midcareer course had been in progress for almost  
25X1 two weeks -- [redacted] was replaced as Chief of the Plans and Policy  
25X1 Staff by [redacted] and at that time the course became an  
25X1 independent program with [redacted] as "Chairman," reporting directly  
to Mr. Baird. This, then, was the chain of events that led to the sepa-  
ration of the midcareer course from the Intelligence School and the  
25X1 "demotion" of [redacted] to an assistant's position.

Midcareer Course No. 1 began on 7 October 1963 as scheduled.

The printed program for the course lists [redacted] as Chair-  
25X1 man and [redacted] (a DDP careerist on rotational assignment to  
X1 OTR) and [redacted] as Assistant Chairmen. A pre-course  
introductory meeting had been held in the Headquarters auditorium on  
the morning of 3 October. The 28 students were addressed by Mr.  
John A. McCone, then the DCI; by Mr. Baird, who discussed the  
"Philosophy of Midcareer Training"; and by [redacted] who

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introduced the course. The students were also briefed by security

officers for the [redacted] On Sunday after-

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The six-week course itself was divided into three major parts.

Part I had two sections, [redacted] -- five and a

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half days on the Agency and six and a half days on Management. In

the section covering the Agency, among the speakers were Mr. Kirk-

patrick, the Executive Director; Mr. Sherman Kent, the Assistant

Director for National Estimates; Mr. Chester Cooper, Special Assist-

ant to the DDI; Mr. William Colby, Chief of the Far East Division of

the DDP; Mr. Richard Helms, then the DDP; Mr. Ray S. Cline, the

DDI; Mr. Cord Meyer, Chief of the Covert Action Staff; Major General

L. A. Walsh, Jr., Chief of the Special Operations Division of the US

Army; Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, Director of DIA; Mr.

Albert Wheelon, the DDS&T; Mr. Arthur Lundahl, Director of NPIC;

Mr. Allen W. Dulles, former DCI; Col. L. K. White, the DDS; Mr.

Robert Bannerman, then Director of Security; and [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] Director of Communications. The second section of

Part I, Management, was conducted, for the most part, by the

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Management Training Faculty of the Intelligence School, but a number of guest speakers were used. These included Dr. Carroll L. Shartle, Chief of Behavioral Science, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense; [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] Syra-  
cuse University; and Mr. John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman of the US Civil Service Commission.

Part II of the course was held at the Brookings Institution in Washington. OTR had contracted with Brookings to provide a ten-day program devoted to discussions of the US Government's functions, structure, and problems. Members of the Brookings staff provided some of the expertise for this coverage, and several high-ranking US officials also appeared as guest lecturers. Part III was a nine-day segment devoted to world affairs. The class met in the Brophy Building, as 1000 North Glebe was then called, and most of the guest speakers were senior officials of the State Department and distinguished academicians from all parts of the country.

The first running of the Midcareer Course established a general pattern that subsequent sessions followed. There were, however, some significant changes made in some segments of the course. The

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contract with Brookings was dropped, and the section on the Government was organized and managed by the course staff. A week-long trip by air was initiated, and the entire class visited major government installations in many parts of the country. The section on Management was revised frequently, and after some time the "Management Grid" was introduced as the major method of management training in the course.

25X1 [redacted] continued as chairman of the course until 21 August 1964, when he returned to the clandestine services. He was replaced

25X1 by [redacted] a long-time OTR careerist, who continued in the assignment until 11 April 1966. [redacted] left the Midcareer Course staff after the second running of the course and returned to his duties with the Intelligence Orientation Faculty of the Intelligence School.

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The first running of the course was judged by students, staff, and senior Agency officials an unqualified success. Thereafter, the course continued to gather prestige, and it became a distinct honor for an officer to be selected for it; selection was a definite indication that the officer chosen was marked for promotion and greater responsibilities. In June 1965, in fact, a headquarters regulation defined

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a midcareerist as a "GS-13 career employee between the ages of 35 and 45 who has the potential for eventual promotion to GS-15 or higher." 58/

Until January 1964 the responsibility for monitoring and maintaining the high quality of the Midcareer Course was assigned to OTR; the course functioned just as did other OTR courses, and admission to it was processed in the usual way -- after the selection of students had been made by various Directorates. On 1 January 1964 the Training Selection Board came into being, \* and the Agency notice that established the board contained the statement that "the Training Selection Board will review continually the Midcareer Training Program and recommend to the Executive Director-Comptroller methods and procedures to insure its continued and improved effectiveness." 59/ Because the midcareer course was the core element of the midcareer program, responsibility for the course was thus assigned to the TSB -- a distinction without a difference, really, as the DTR was Chairman of the TSB.

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\* See OTR-7.

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In June 1965 the name of the course was changed to "The Mid-career Executive Development Course" by an Agency regulation. 60/ The same regulation stated that "the Chairman, TSB, shall continually monitor the Midcareer Training Program . . . and approve nominees for the Midcareer Executive Development Course." Thus the midcareer course achieved the same status as the senior service schools and the other senior courses for which students were selected by the TSB.

As suggested above, the midcareer course was the only viable part of the midcareer program. Theoretically, the course was to have been only one of many training programs that the midcareerists were to have taken; the program concept assumed that each of the Agency career services would identify the midcareerists within the service and then prepare a detailed plan for the career development of each officer selected. The plan was to include the midcareer course and other programs, both internal and external, that would contribute to career development. In practice, the midcareer program was ignored, forgotten, or given only token recognition -- except, of course, in the Office of Training. Mr. Baird made a valiant effort to put it into operation and actually required that each OTR midcareerist have a definite

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career development plan. Even in OTR, however, the exigencies of work pressures, manpower limitations, and lack of availability of slots generally prevented the implementation of the plans.

Mr. Baird also made a strenuous effort to get other career services to comply with the program's requirements. On 9 March 1964 he wrote a "Dear Kirk" memorandum to Mr. Kirkpatrick, pointing out that the several Deputy Directors were not submitting mid-career plans to the TSB and suggesting that the Executive Director-Comptroller take some action; a draft of an appropriate "Action Memorandum" was attached. 61/ Two days later the Executive Director-Comptroller issued the action memorandum just as Mr. Baird had drafted it. 62/ It was addressed to the Chairman of the TSB; it pointed out that enough time had elapsed since December of 1963, when the original requirement for midcareer training plans had been levied, to permit the starting of midcareer programming, and it requested that the Chairman of the TSB submit a status report no later than 1 May 1964. A copy of the action memorandum went to each of the Deputy Directors.

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On 16 March Mr. Baird sent to the Deputy Directors a request that they submit to him by 17 April the information necessary for compliance with the Executive Director-Comptroller's request for a status report. 63/ The Deputy Directors responded to some degree, at least, and Mr. Baird submitted the requested report on 2 May 1964. 64/ The language of the report revealed that all of the Directorates had the very best of intentions but thus far had not been able to do much in the way of actual career planning -- beyond the selection of their midcareerists for the midcareer course, that is. On 25 June the Executive Director-Comptroller issued another action memorandum on the subject, this one addressed to the Deputy Directors and a bit sharp in tone. 65/ In effect, it told the Deputy Directors to get going and do what they had been directed to do about midcareer planning -- or if they couldn't do it, to see the Executive Director-Comptroller personally and explain why.

Further efforts were made by Mr. Baird -- with Mr. Kirkpatrick's strong support -- but the midcareer training program never really materialized; and after Mr. Kirkpatrick left the Agency in September 1965, and Mr. Baird retired at the end of 1965, the program was allowed to languish and was quietly ignored. The midcareer

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course, however, continued to flourish -- until April 1966 as a separate, non-school program and after that as a function of the OTR Support School.

F. Special Activities and Programs

In addition to the regularly scheduled courses and programs developed and given by the IOF during the 1956-66 period, the faculty conducted a number of special activities that involved a considerable amount of planning, preparation, and instruction. These activities and programs were significant enough to warrant mention here.

1. Special Orientations

Because there were so many Agency personnel who -- by reason of their specialized assignments -- were exempt from the requirement to take the Intelligence Orientation course, there were frequent requests for special orientation briefings for special groups. Beginning in 1960, for example, the National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC) began to expand rapidly, and the IOF was called upon for special orientation programs -- including an unclassified one for personnel, and the IOF provided a major part of the instruction for that program. During calendar year 1958 the IOF presented an 18-hour refresher course for 13 officers from the Agency Signal Center

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and a half-day orientation program for 25 new engineer employees of the Office of Communications. 66/ In 1959 two more specials for the Signal Center were given for 30 employees, and two were given for 26 employees of the Printing Services Division of the Office of Logistics.

67/ In 1960 two special programs were given for [ ] instructional and 25X1 support personnel [ ] one was given for 11 people from the Technical Services Division of the DDP, and one was given for 13 people from the Office of Security. 68/ This kind of special orientation activity continued throughout the 1956-66 period. The examples cited above are by no means inclusive, but they do indicate the nature of the special orientation programs conducted by the IOF.

## 2. The JCS-DIA Program

As noted earlier,\* in 1954 the OTR Operations Training School had initiated a program called Project USEFUL, a one-week course designed to meet the need-to-know requirements of the military officers who worked with CIA personnel -- usually at overseas locations. Late in 1963 the DCI decided that an abridged version of USEFUL should be presented for senior military personnel in the Washington

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\* See OTR-6, p. 134.

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area -- primarily officers attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency. For some unexplained reason, the task was assigned to the IOF instead of to the Operations School, and on 1 and 2 February 1964 the first JCS-DIA Orientation was given. 69/ The objectives of the program were "to introduce the class members to key officials of the CIA, who will discuss the organization and responsibilities of the Agency's interrelationships with the other agencies and departments of the intelligence community." 70/

The "key officials of the CIA" included the DCI, the DDCI, the Executive Director-Comptroller, all of the Deputy Directors, and some of the senior Division and Staff chiefs. The instructors of the IOF did the planning and scheduling of the programs, introduced the speakers, and handled all of the security and logistical aspects of each program. The student group varied in size, usually from 60 to 80 officers, and not infrequently there were General Officers and Flag Officers in the groups. The program was offered twice each year from 1964 to 1966, and it has continued as a regular activity since that time.

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### 3. The Senior Schools Program

Although the so-called Senior Schools Program was developed by the IOF late in the 1956-66 period, it subsequently became a well established and highly regarded course of orientation training. Until 1965 those Agency officers who were selected for attendance in senior external training programs in either the military schools or academic institutions were assembled each year for briefings conducted by the OTR Registrar Staff. These briefings were largely concerned with the logistical and liaison aspects of the external training assignments. It gradually became apparent -- primarily through the post-training reports that each officer submitted at the completion of external training -- that Agency officers needed more substantive guidance. Almost always, at some time during the course of the external training, they were faced with the problem of how to respond to questions about the Agency. How much could they tell? How much did they know about what they could tell?

Early in 1965 the Executive Director-Comptroller decided that all Agency personnel assigned to the senior schools should be given the guidance they needed to permit them to respond intelligently to questions about the Agency's activities. The IOF was assigned

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the responsibility for designing and giving such a program, and in July 1965 the first course was given. It was a four-day program\* with the rather cumbersome title of "Special Program for Agency Representatives to the Senior Service Schools." The title was inaccurate, of course, for the group was not limited to representatives to the senior service schools but included those who were going to senior civilian programs, both government and academic.\*\*

The content of the course included a review of the rationale on which the Agency was founded, a review of the Agency's missions and functions and its role in the intelligence community, discussions of the criticisms commonly levied against the Agency (including the misconceptions on which many of the criticisms were based), and guidance on how to respond properly to both criticisms and questions. The guidance element of the course was provided both by senior Agency

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\* After 1965 the course was shortened to three days.

\*\* The inaccuracy -- if not the cumbrousness -- was repaired in 1966, when the course was re-named "Orientation for Nominees to Senior Officer Schools."

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officials and by Agency officers who had completed the training programs to which the members of the class were going. A part of the course was set aside for the necessary procedural briefings given by the Registrar Staff.

4. Publications

Throughout the 1956-66 period the IOF instructors were engaged in the preparation of "staff papers" for use in the various orientation courses and for dissemination to components of the Agency outside the Headquarters area. These papers were primarily condensations of substantive information about a phase of intelligence activity or organization. For the orientation courses, they served as collateral reading, and for non-headquarters components they served as substitutes for formal orientation training. Although the publication activity was a minor part of the work of the IOF, over a period of years it resulted in a useful library of staff papers on intelligence subjects.

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## VI. The Intelligence Production Faculty

In Mr. Baird's June 1956 official statement of the missions of the Intelligence School, he included responsibilities for training in "methods and techniques of instruction; techniques of effective writing and speaking; the improvement of reading skill; and skills and methods involved in the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence." \*

These responsibilities were those assigned to the Intelligence Production Faculty (IPF) when it was established in 1957. \*\* The present discussion follows subsequent developments and describes the introduction of new programs during the 1956-66 period. For convenience and clarity, the work of the IPF is discussed here in four categories -- skills courses, research courses, courses given as parts of the JOT training program, and the preparation of training manuals. Perhaps it should be noted at this point that the four categories are not mutually exclusive. The skills courses involved some substantive research activities, the research courses required the practice of skills, and the JOTP courses included both skills training and research training.

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\* See above, pp. 7-8.

\*\* Development in these fields of training up to June of 1956 has been described in OTR-6.

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A. Skills Courses

Those programs designed primarily to improve the skills required in all phases of intelligence production activity were called "skills courses." They included training in writing and speaking, training in the techniques of interviewing and debriefing, reading improvement, and training in the methods and techniques of teaching.

1. Writing

In the intelligence business, as in most other forms of organized human activity, writing is the major means of communication. In the intelligence business, moreover, there is a heightened requirement for accuracy and precision in writing. Undoubtedly the most frequent adverse criticism of Agency officers -- at all levels -- has been that they lacked the ability to write accurately and precisely. It should be remembered, of course, that criticizing other people's writing is a popular exercise, and most people who cast the critical stones are unaware that they themselves are not without sin. In any event, the most frequently voiced training requirement in the Agency was for writing programs, and thus such programs constituted a significant part of the IPF function.

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Courses in writing had been given by Agency training units since the beginning of the Agency. The first one to be given after OTR was established was called Problems of Intelligence Writing. In December 1954 the name was changed to Intelligence Writing, and early in 1956 it became the Writing Workshop.\* When the Intelligence School was established in June of 1956, this course became one of its programs. At that time, it was a four-week course, meeting in two three-hour sessions each week, and the enrollment was limited to twelve students. 71/ The course continued to be given several times each year until it became a part of a writing workshop program that was introduced in September 1958; that program is described in some detail below.

A second writing course inherited by the Intelligence School in June 1956 was one called Effective Writing, which had been started in April 1956. This course was taught by a contract instructor,

25X1 [redacted] It was a 20-hour course meeting in two three-hour sessions each week over a five-week period with the enrollment limited to 20 students. 72/ The

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\* See OTR-6, p. 105.

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first running of the course began on 10 April 1956, and two runnings were given each year until July 1959, when the course was terminated.

73/ According to the officer who was chief of the IPF at the time, there were two reasons for the termination of the course. 74/ The expanded writing workshop program was then in operation and could accommodate the students who might take the [redacted] course; and the course itself was largely a "theory" course, without practical relevance to intelligence writing as such.

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In September 1958 the chief of the IPF proposed to the chief of the school a "Writing Workshop Program." 75/ The program would include a writing course at the basic level and one at the intermediate level; the level to which students would be assigned would be determined by standard tests administered by the OTR A&E Staff. The program would also include a writing course at the advanced level, each running to be tailored to the needs of an individual Agency component. The proposal was approved by the chief of the school and by the DTR, and by November 1958 the writing workshop program was in operation. 76/

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The Writing Workshop (Basic) and the Writing Workshop (Intermediate) continued to be given, each of them four times a year, throughout the remainder of the 1956-66 period and for some years thereafter. These courses differed from the Effective Writing course in that they were practical, do-it-and-do-it-over-again courses using intelligence materials -- as often as possible, the kinds of intelligence materials with which the individual student worked in his Agency job. Both the basic and the intermediate workshops were part-time courses meeting in two three-hour sessions each week for a period of four weeks. The classes were kept small so that the instructor would have adequate time to spend with individual students, primarily in the revision and the rewriting of papers. The average yearly attendance in the basic and intermediate workshops combined was about 125 students. 77/

In 1960 a correspondence-course version of Writing Workshop (Basic) was developed. 78/ This was designed for Agency officers who, because of the location or nature of their jobs, could not attend regular classes. Arrangements were made, however, for the correspondence course students to have periodic personal conference with the instructor whenever such arrangements were possible.

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Also in 1960, a writing guide was prepared and published for the use of students in the workshop programs. 79/ This was a revision of a manual that had originally been prepared by [redacted] for the guidance of ORR analysts, and it was tailored to the requirements of intelligence writing. The first of the advanced writing workshops was given in November 1958. It was designed for DDS personnel who were involved in the writing of Agency issuances and was called Advanced Writing Workshop (Regulations Writing). 80/ A second running of this course was given in May 1960, 81/ and in June of 1960 an advanced workshop was given for DDS personnel whose jobs included the preparation of staff studies. 82/ This latter course was called Advanced Writing Workshop (DDS Special), and most of the students were DDS officers at the GS-14 and GS-15 levels. This course was given again later in 1960 for DDS officers at the GS-15 through GS-18 levels and was given once in 1961 for another senior group. 83/ The chief instructor for these advanced workshops during the period was [redacted]

who was chief of the IPF and later chief of the school. After 1961

25X1 [redacted] took over as chief instructor for advanced workshops designed for ORR, OSI, and other Agency components.

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The writing training programs of the IPF continued throughout the 1956-66 period. Perhaps the best capsulization of the nature and purpose of the writing workshops is provided in a 1962 report from the Chief of the Intelligence School to the DTR:

The Writing Workshop Program gives writing instruction at three levels of proficiency and assigns students to appropriate levels of proficiency on the basis of performance in writing tests administered by the OTR Assessment and Evaluation Staff. The students in these courses come from all components of the Agency, and their grades range from the lowest through the supergrades. The program includes special writing training to meet special substantive requirements, a correspondence course for Agency people who cannot attend classes, and a course that is limited to employees of grades GS-15 through GS-18. During fiscal year 1962, CIA employees spent 3,992 hours receiving instruction in the Writing Workshop Program. In addition, of course, writing instruction is a significant part of the Intelligence School courses for Junior Officer trainees.

2. Speaking

Before 1956 there had been units of speaking, or briefing, training in some OTR courses, but not until that time was there a separate course in speaking. Early in 1956 a contract instructor, Prof.

25X1 [redacted] was brought in to give a course at first called Intelligence Briefing and later called Effective Speaking. 84/ This was a 24-hour, part-time course, meeting four hours each week over a period of six weeks. The classes were small,

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usually limited to 15 students, and the work consisted of short talks given by the students followed by critiques by the instructor and the students of the class. It was a course in the basic techniques of public speaking, and it was not directly addressed to the problems of intelligence briefing.

After the first running of the course, early in 1956, Prof. 25X1 [redacted] was asked to give a similar course dealing with the conduct of meetings and conferences. He agreed to do this, and in March 1956 it was announced that a course called Conference Leadership would be substituted for the next scheduled running of the speaking course. 85/ Thereafter, the speaking course and the conference leadership course were given alternately, and the average annual enrollment in the two courses was about 85 students. 86/ These courses continued to be 25X1 given by [redacted] throughout the 1956-66 period and continued until 1969, when he terminated his contract with the Agency.

As early as 1961, however, a new speaking course had been initiated by the IPF. This course, Intelligence Briefing, was suggested by the chief of the school and approved by the DTR. 87/ It did not duplicate the effective speaking course being given by Prof. 25X1 [redacted] it was given on a somewhat more sophisticated level and was

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given in 1961 for a group of twelve senior DDS officers. It was a 24-hour course spread over four weeks, and it required a considerable amount of out-of-class preparation. In a 1961 report to the DDS, the DTR labeled the course a "significant achievement" and commented that "the instructor introduced the use of sound film photography of the student in action."\* 88/ The intelligence briefing course continued to be offered on a when-requested basis, and each running was tailored to the specific needs of the requesting component.\*\*

3. Interviewing

Like training in speaking, training in interviewing and debriefing had been given as parts of some regularly scheduled courses for some years. The first interviewing course, as such, was developed by the IPF in 1958. 89/ This course was requested by the Contact Division of the Office of Operations; it was subsequently given as a regular part of the OO/C Refresher Program. 90/ The course was

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\* In 1964 video tape replaced the film and was much more effective as a critique device.

25X1 \*\* [redacted] to serve as chief instructor until late 1968, took over the task.

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also given to other Agency components when requested, and in 1960 it became a part of the Intelligence Production course given for JOT's.

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4. Reading and Instructor Training

As noted earlier in this volume, the reading improvement program staff, although it was established as a separate "faculty" in 1957, became a part of the IPF in 1958 -- for administrative purposes. The reading improvement program has been covered in Volume I of this paper\* and is not reviewed here. When the Intelligence School was established in June 1956, it inherited from the Basic School the responsibility for instructor training. At about the same time, the instructor who gave the Instructional Techniques course, as it was called, 92/ was transferred to another assignment; and the course was not actually given by the IPF. Late in 1958, the responsibility for instructor training was assigned to the OTR A&E Staff, and in August 1959 it became a part of the duties of the Educational Specialist in the Plans and Policy Staff.\*\*

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\* See OTR-5, p. 34.

\*\* See OTR-7, p. 85.

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B. Research Courses

Before the establishment of the Intelligence School, training in the methods and facilities used in intelligence research had been limited to small segments in general orientation courses and had been largely descriptive. After the establishment of the school, an effort was made to provide more training programs for the DDI components of the Agency; and the requirement for in-depth study of intelligence research methods appeared to be the most pressing one. The following paragraphs describe the efforts made and the results achieved by the IPF in developing such training programs.

1. Intelligence Research (Techniques)

Until mid-1957 the Intelligence School had no instructor who was fully qualified by training and experience to develop a course in intelligence research. At that time, [redacted] transferred to OTR from ORR, where he had served as a research analyst for more than five years. [redacted] doctoral degree was in Geography, and his pre-Agency experience included military intelligence research and teaching at both the public school and college levels. Soon after he came to OTR, he was assigned to the job of developing the research segments of the Intelligence Techniques course and a

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separate intelligence research course for DDI components. What he accomplished in relation to the JOTP courses is described briefly later in this section. By the end of 1957 [redacted] had completed the design for a course called Intelligence Research (Techniques) -- IR(T). The first running of the course began in January 1958 and was completed on 7 February. 93/ The course ran for four weeks, part time, and concentrated primarily on the research sources that were available to the intelligence analyst -- the libraries, registers, and other repositories of information. A second running of the course was given in the early summer of 1958. 94/ After the two trial runnings of the course,

25X1 [redacted] and the faculty chief decided -- with the support of the critiques of the students -- that the course should be extended over a longer period of time and should include more practical exercises in the use of research sources. In September 1958 it was announced that 120-hour IR(T) covering a six-weeks period would begin on 13 October

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for ORR analysts and that two runnings for OSI analysts had been scheduled -- one in November and one in March 1959. 95/ These courses were given as scheduled.\*

In the development of the IR(T) course, [redacted] had found it necessary to prepare written guides for the students to use in their exploitation of the various kinds of information repositories. By late 1958 it became apparent that these guides, revised and supplemented, would constitute a handbook on intelligence research that would serve not only the students in the course but also all intelligence analysts in the intelligence community. In September 1958 the chief of the school reported that "one staff member is writing a training aid to be used in the Intelligence Research (Techniques) course. It will be the first complete compilation of research facilities available to the intelligence analyst." 96/ By June 1959 the first draft of the training manual, Intelligence Research Facilities and Techniques, was published. 97/ This draft was circulated throughout the Agency and to some non-Agency components of the intelligence community and was

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\* Thereafter during the 1956-66 period, the course was given when specifically requested by an Agency component. In the latter years of the period, the demand for the course decreased, and it was given infrequently.

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later revised and republished. Since that time, it has had wide service as a basic manual for intelligence research. This manual, incidentally, was used in the first attempts in OTR to program intelligence training material; by July 1961 [redacted] 25X  
the Specialist in Programmed Instruction,\* had completed the programming of the first two Parts of the text. 98/ [redacted] 25X used the programmed material experimentally in some OTR courses, and he made arrangements to have it tried out in an intelligence research course given by the Defense Intelligence School. He later revised the programmed parts completely, and since that time they have been used as supplementary exercises in research courses.

2. Intelligence Research (Maps)

Another research course developed by the IPF, actually the first of the individual courses in research, was Intelligence Research (Maps) -- IR(M). [redacted] 25X an instructor in the intelligence production group when the school was established, initiated the course, compiled the materials, and gave the course early in 1957 as a segment of the Intelligence Techniques course. Two runnings of

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\* See OTR-7, p. 91.

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the course as a separate offering were scheduled for April and June 1958, but both were canceled because of lack of enrollment. 99/ In July 1958 the course was given for five students, 100/ and it was given again in the first half of 1959 for an equally small group. 101/ Although the IR(M) course proved to have a much lesser requirement than had been anticipated, it did provide the foundation for a third research course that became a very important part of the IPF program.

3. Intelligence Research (Map and Photo Interpretation)

In the mid-1950's the Agency's photointelligence (PI) activities were the responsibility of the PI Division in the Geographic Research area in the Office of Research and Reports. Even then, the importance of photographic interpretation had assumed major proportions, and the need for competent people in the field was pressing. To help meet the need, the ORR PI Staff, as it was then called, initiated a basic training course. This was considered "component" training, and it was developed and conducted by members of the PI Staff. At that time, OTR had no capability for providing training in photointelligence, and not until 1960 did the Intelligence School acquire the capability, when [redacted] a professional photointelligence officer, transferred to OTR. In March 1960 [redacted] gave a

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segment of photointelligence training to the JOT's in the Intelligence Production course, and later in the same year he gave a separate course, called Map and Photo Reading, to a group of 13 non-JOT Agency analysts. 102/ This was a 27-hour course, spread over a three-week period, combining the content of the IR(M) course with a new segment on photointerpretation.

In March 1961 the name of the course was changed to Intelligence Research (Map and Photo Reading) -- IR(M&P) -- and a major new element was introduced into the course. This is best described by the instructor's course report:

Students enrolled in the Intelligence Research (Map and Photo Reading) course went on an aerial reconnaissance flight Friday morning, 31 March. Before the flight, the students received training in the exploitation for intelligence of the types of photography collected through the Attache, OO/C, OCR/LCD, and DDP programs. [redacted] from DDP/TSD gave the students instruction in the proper use of cameras and films for acquiring aerial photographs through the windows of a commercial airliner. The instruction prior to the flight placed emphasis on what the photointerpreter and photogrammetrist need to obtain, as much intelligence information from photography as possible, in addition to the problems involved in taking photography under operational conditions.

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Cameras and films were provided and each student was assigned a particular area or installation for which photo coverage was desired. In addition, each student was to take photographs of other targets that he thought may be of

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intelligence significance and maintain a trip log so that at the end of the flight he could locate and identify each of his exposures.

Another objective of the flight was to give the students an opportunity for an air view or a "PI view" of various installations and surface features of intelligence significance. Several large installations were circled by the aircraft to give a complete 360 degree aerial view of the installation.  
103/

The IR(M&P) course -- later called Intelligence Research (Map and Photo Interpretation) -- continued to be offered twice a year 25X1 through 1956. [redacted] served as chief instructor until 1964, when he was assigned to a rotational tour of duty with ORR, and he was 25X1 followed by [redacted] who was also an experienced photo-intelligence officer.

#### 4. Geography of the USSR

Another research course developed by the IPF during the 60's was Geography of the USSR. The requirement for this course was an informal one; it was first requested by ORR analysts, and OSI later expressed an interest in having such a course. [redacted] began the planning of the course late in 1961, and -- with the help of [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] -- completed a course schedule and assembled all of the materials for the course. The first running came in October 1962. 104/ 25X1 25X1

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The course ran part time for four weeks; it provided basic coverage of the USSR with emphasis on those factors that might affect the scientific capabilities and economic development of the area. The first class was made up of twelve analysts, about two-thirds of them from ORR. After the first running of the course, the requirement for it appeared to fade, and it was not given again until 1963, when it was re-designed to exclude classified training material and given as a part of a training program for new-on-board NPIC employees awaiting final security clearance. During 1963 and 1964 it was given three times in this program.\*

C. JOTP Courses

Although the details of the Junior Officer Training Program are covered in a separate historical paper, it should be noted here that two important segments of that program were provided by the IPF. These two segments were the Intelligence Techniques course and the Intelligence Production course.

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\* In 1968 the IPF developed another geography course, the Geography of Communist China. The first running of the course began in December 1968 and was completed in January 1969.

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1. Intelligence Techniques

Before the Intelligence School was established in June 1956, the Intelligence Training School had given a six-week course called Intelligence Principles and Methods (IPM), a course that was required for all new professional personnel of the Agency. In July 1956, when the newly created IS was reorganizing the training programs inherited from its two predecessors, the IPM was broken into two sections -- a two-week program called the Intelligence Orientation Course (IOC) and a four-week program called the Intelligence Techniques Course (ITC). 105/ As noted earlier in this paper, the IOC retained the mandatory aspect of the IPM, which was later extended to apply to all professional employees of the Agency. The ITC, however, was an elective course taken primarily by those officers who were assigned to analyst positions and by the JOT's who had an interest in the processing and production phases of intelligence.

Between July 1956 and December 1958, the ITC was given eleven times for small groups of students, most of them JOT's. 106/ In 1958, the JOT program was reorganized -- or "integrated" -- to establish separate, special courses for JOT's only and to set a uniform sequence of training for all JOT's. One of the courses required

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of all JOT's was the ITC. Before December 1958 enrollment in the ITC had been limited to 20 students; but when the course became a JOT requirement, it had to be revised so that it would accommodate 50 or more. In the December 1958 running of the ITC -- the first given for JOT's only -- there were 54 students. 107/

The ITC, along with three other courses in the overall program\* was required of JOT's regardless of their areas of primary interest or probable future assignment because senior OTR officers had agreed that all of the young officers in the program should know something about all aspects of Agency activities and should not be immediately directed into specialized channels that might lead to parochialism. This reasoning was implicit in the official statement of the objectives of the course as they were determined in September 1958: "The objectives of the new Intelligence Techniques are to give the students a basic understanding of the nature and purpose of finished intelligence, of the problems inherent in the production of intelligence, and the techniques and skills required in solving those problems." 108/

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\* Intelligence Orientation, International Communism, and Operations Familiarization.

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The four-week ITC for the JOT's was, from the beginning, a do-it-yourself course. There were no guest lecturers; because the course intended to convey only a basic understanding of intelligence production techniques, the course instructors -- all of whom had had some years of experience in the DDI -- could provide the degree of expertise required. The problem-solving method was the primary teaching device, and actual intelligence documents -- sometimes a bit contrived -- were used as the materials for the problems. The students presented their solutions as exercises in intelligence writing or intelligence briefing, and all presentations and papers were critiqued by the instructors.

The chief instructor in the first running of the course 25X1 was [redacted] who was chief of the IPF at the time. He was 25X1 assisted by [redacted] and other IPF instructors took part in some segments of the course. After [redacted] 25X1 became chief of the school in 1959, he continued to participate in the 25X1 course although [redacted] took over the chief instructor job. In 1959 25X1 [redacted] transferred to OTR from an analyst position in OCI, and a major part of his assignment was the ITC.

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The first running of the JOT ITC set the general pattern for subsequent runnings, but refinements and improvements were made continuously. The course was offered three or four times each year -- depending upon the size of the annual intake of JOT's -- throughout the remainder of the 1956-66 period and for some years thereafter.

2. Intelligence Production

When the JOT program was reorganized and integrated in 1958, it was decided that in-depth training in the methods of intelligence production should be given for those JOT's who, at the conclusion of the general training parts of the program -- Intelligence Orientation, International Communism, Intelligence Techniques, and Operations Familiarization -- were selected for assignment to the DDI area of the Agency. This was to be the DDI equivalent of the DDP-oriented Operations Course.

The first implementing proposal, made by the chief of the Intelligence School in September 1958, was that there be established "a twelve-week training period in Intelligence Research (Techniques) for a selected group destined for intelligence production." 109/ Before that proposal was actually sent to the DTR, the chief of the IPF recommended to the chief of the school that the course for the DDI-bound

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JOT's should not be an adaptation of the old IR(T) but should be a new course designed specifically for the JOT's. His recommendation was approved, and on 19 September the chief of the IPF submitted to the deputy chief of the school a proposal that "A twelve-week Intelligence Production Course . . . be given for selected Junior Officer Trainees beginning on or about 26 January 1959. The objective of the Intelligence Production Course is to prepare the student for assignment as an intelligence officer in the DDI area of the Agency by giving him a thorough understanding of the nature and purpose of the intelligence production effort in the DDI area and of the problems inherent in that effort, and by giving him specific training and practice in the application of the techniques and skills required in the production of intelligence." 110/ This proposal became the agreed plan for the course as it was stated by the chief of the school late in September 111/ and by the DTR in August 1959. 112/

The first running of the Intelligence Production Course (IPC) came in January 1959, as scheduled, with nine students in the 25X1 class and [redacted] as chief instructor. Like the ITC, the IPC was essentially a do-it-yourself course using problem solving as the major method of instruction. The IPC differed from the ITC, however, in

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many ways. The basic objective of the four-week ITC was to give the student a general understanding of the methods and problems of intelligence production; the objective of the twelve-week IPC was to broaden and deepen this understanding and to give the student some competence in the practical skills required in intelligence production. The IPC, then, used the experts and specialists in the various production components of the DDI as guest speakers and resource people. The students also visited the production components and observed the analysts in action.

The general procedure in the course was that the students would study one DDI component, watch it in action, and then work out a live problem of the kind that the component faced; the problem solutions would be critiqued -- often by one or more of the component analysts -- and then the class would begin on another component. The problem solving required actual practice in the exploitation of all of the sources available to the intelligence analyst, and thus the students gained some competence in the basic disciplines of intelligence research.

The IPC continued to be given throughout the period from 1959 to 1966, usually twice each year. The course was frequently changed in sequence of component coverage and in areas of emphasis,

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and new activities were added from time to time. For example, in the second running of the course, the coverage of the Office of Current Intelligence was expanded from one week to two, a unit on propaganda analysis was introduced, and in the section on photointelligence a one-  
25X1 day field trip to [redacted] was added. 113/ The length of the course was also changed from time to time, usually to facilitate scheduling of the overall JOT training program or to accommodate JOT assignments to on-the-job training.

D. Training Manuals

In 1964 a project of preparing a series of training manuals on the Office of the DDI area was initiated by [redacted] then chief of the IPF. The purpose of the project was to provide students, primarily the JOT's in the ITC and the IPC, with study and reference handbooks that described in some detail the organization, mission, and function of each of the production components of the DDI. The work on these manuals was done by the IPF instructors, working closely with the  
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DDI components. The first manual, [redacted]

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was completed in July of 1965; four more were completed in subsequent years.\*

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\* National Intelligence Estimates in September of 1967, the Office of Economic Research in May of 1969, Scientific and Technical Intelligence in August of 1969, and The Office of Current Intelligence in May of 1970.

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## VII. The Management Training Faculty

In February 1964, in compliance with a request from the DDS, the  
Chief of the Management Training Faculty (MTF) of the Intelligence  
25X1 School, then [redacted] prepared a "Review of Agency Man-  
agement Training." That paper, a brief history of management train-  
ing in the Agency from 1954 to 1964, appears as an appendix to this  
chapter.\* The following paragraphs are designed to supplement Dr.  
25X1 [redacted] 1964 paper and to describe management training activities  
from 1964 through 1965. Perhaps the most convenient organizational  
pattern to use here is a four-category one: "in-house courses," the  
management and supervision courses given entirely by the MTF; the

"Managerial Grid," a program that used a somewhat novel -- at least at that time -- approach to management training.

## \* Appendix A.

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A. In-House Courses

Training in management and supervision, from the initiation of the "Human Resources Program" in August 1952 to June 1956, has been described in an earlier volume of this paper.\* By the end of the 1956 fiscal year, OTR's experimental ventures into management training had developed into a group of well established courses.\*\* In an OTR report covering training activities during fiscal 1956, the DTR characterized "the growing requirement for management and supervision courses" as one of the significant activities of the year. 114/

At that time and for the next two years, the program consisted of a basic management course and a basic supervision course, both given for 40 hours over a two-week period and both given repeatedly throughout the year. The management course was open to all Agency officers at or above the GS-11 grade and the supervision course to personnel generally in the GS-05 to GS-11 range. Until December 1957 the training in both courses was based on available text books. At that

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\* See OTR-6, p. 110.

\*\* The term "management training" is used here and hereafter to include both management and supervision courses unless the context clearly limits the reference to management courses only.

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time, the use of text books was abandoned, and selected articles and case histories were substituted. Also in 1958, films were introduced as training devices, and in 1959 several short management training films were produced by the OTR film unit.\* A device called the "in-basket exercise" was introduced in 1958.

During this period the MTF was composed of three instructors.

From June 1956 to January 1957, [redacted] was chief instructor of the management courses, and [redacted] handled the supervision courses. [redacted] and in

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January 1957 he became chief instructor; later in the same year he became chief of the MTF when the faculty was established. Miss

25X1 [redacted] continued as chief instructor of the supervision courses.

25X1 Late in 1958 [redacted] introduced a series of management and supervision courses tailored to the needs of individual Agency components. These courses were essentially the same as the regularly scheduled courses, but the design and content of each was determined only after the members of the MTF had studied the specific managerial problems within the component for which the course was to be given.

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\* See OTR-6, p. 94.

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During 1959 and 1960, such courses were given for the Office of Communications, the Office of Research and Reports, and the Office of Scientific Intelligence. 115/

The "in-house" courses in management and supervision continued to be offered throughout the 1956-66 period. Although after 1959 25X1 the introduction of the [redacted] courses and the Managerial Grid gradually replaced most of the management courses, some were still offered, and the supervision courses continued to be given several times each year -- thirteen times in 1960 and seven times in 1963, for example.\*

25X1      B. [redacted]

Early in 1959 Col. White, then the Deputy Director for Support, completed the three-month Advanced Management Program at Harvard University.\*\* Thereafter he became keenly interested in management training and suggested to the DTR that [redacted] 25X

25X1 [redacted] might be brought in on a contract basis to give management courses for senior Agency personnel. Col. White

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\* See Appendix A, Attachment.

\*\* See OTR-5, p. 44.

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The course ran for two weeks at [redacted] there were 35  
Agency officers in the group, their grades ranging from GS-15 to  
GS-18. The course consisted largely of lectures by [redacted] and  
intensive study and discussion of individual cases involving manage-  
ment problems. The students' critiques of the course were generally  
favorable. The cost of the program, as reported by [redacted] in  
November 1960, 117/ was \$8,590.14; of this total, about \$1,000 was  
for preliminary, non-recurring activities and about \$5,400 was for Dr.

25X1 [redacted] fees and expenses. On the buckslip under which the DTR sent

25X1 [redacted] report to Col. White appears Mr. Baird's handwritten  
notation: "It looks like a \$15,000 budget item for two two-week courses  
a year." The report was routed back to Mr. Baird with Col. White's  
handwritten notation on the buckslip: "High but I think worth it if they  
are as good as the first."

In accordance with Col. White's implied approval of the first  
course, plans went forward to continue giving the course on a twice-  
a-year schedule. Late in November 1960 Mr. Baird recommended to  
the DCI that [redacted] be appointed a consultant to the Director of  
Training at a fee of \$50 a day "when in Washington." 118/ The memo-  
randum making this recommendation implies, but does not state, that

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the \$50-a-day consultant's fee would cover [redacted] services "in connection with the development of management training" but would not cover his services while giving the Advanced Management Course.

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25X1 Actually, [redacted] did little or no consulting work for the Agency. He became ill early in 1961, and the second running of his course, scheduled for the spring of 1961, was canceled.

In August 1961, however, the Acting Deputy Director for Support announced to the other Deputy Directors that a second senior seminar would be given by [redacted] in October. 119/ This course went forward as scheduled. It began on 16 October and ran through the 28th; there were 33 students in the group, all in the GS-15 through GS-18 grade range. The content and conduct of the course were the same as in the first running. In December 1961 Mr.


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25X1 [redacted] then chief of the MTF, submitted an analysis of the students' critiques of the course. 120/ This analysis, along with a detailed chronological record of the logistical support required by

25X1 [redacted] and his wife before and during the course, 121/ indicated that most of the students thought that the course was well worth the investment of their time, that [redacted] was an effective instructor, that he was inclined to work from a pedestal position, and that he

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demanded full VIP treatment with no expense spared. This second

25X1 running was the last of the [redacted] courses; he died early in 1962, and \*

by that time another contract instructor, [redacted] had been

brought in to give a senior management course.

25X1 C. [redacted]

Early in the spring of 1961, when it became apparent that Dr.

25X1 [redacted] would not be available for the planned second running of the

Senior Management Seminar, the MTF looked around for another con-

tract instructor qualified to give management training at the senior

25X1 level. At that time, [redacted] a retired Brigadier General and

[redacted]  
had achieved some distinction as a management consultant with the Air

25X1 Force and the Army. [redacted] then chief of the MTF, found that Dr.

25X1 [redacted] would be available to the Agency and initiated preliminary

arrangements. By 11 May 1961 a contract had been negotiated, Dr.

25X1 [redacted] had been fully cleared, and the DTR, the Inspector General, and

the Deputy Director for Support had briefed him on the Agency's

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management problems. 122/ A record of the last of these briefings,

25X1 that given [redacted] by Col. White, identifies and describes in some detail the attitudinal approach to management in the Agency.\*

By 15 May 1961 all arrangements for the first [redacted] course, called the Seminar in Management Practices, were complete and the nominees had been selected by the three Directorates. 123/ The course, a one-week program, began on 11 June at [redacted] and continued through 17 June. There were 30 students in the class, ten from each of the Directorates, all of them GS-15's. The general format of the course was similar to that of the [redacted] course -- lecturers, case histories, readings, small-group discussions, and seminars.

25X1 The [redacted] course made greater use of case histories than did the [redacted] course, and -- because it ran for 40 hours instead of 80 -- there was a greater concentration of class-room activities. The analysis of the students' critiques of the course indicated that it "was enthusiastically received, and more than eighty percent of the critiques were laudatory." 124/ The conclusion reached by the MTF, supported by the DTR, was that the course had been successful and that additional runnings were justified.

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\* See Appendix B.

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The second running of the [redacted] course was given at [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] from 24 June 1962 through 30 June. This run-  
ning began on a Sunday afternoon and continued through the morning of  
the following Saturday. 125/ This running, too, was "enthusiastically  
received" by the students, and in June 1963 the third and last of the

25X1 [redacted] from 6 through 14  
June -- again from Sunday afternoon through Saturday noon. 126/

D. The Managerial Grid

In the late summer of 1963, after the third running of the

25X1 [redacted] -- who had succeeded [redacted] as  
chief of the MTF in February 1962 -- began to explore a new approach  
to management training called the Managerial Grid, a program devel-  
oped by a [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] The background and development of this program applied  
to Agency training are described in Appendix A and are not repeated  
here. In general, Phase I of the Managerial Grid\* consisted of a

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\* The complete Grid program included three phases. Phase I was the basic phase and was applicable to all Agency officers; Phase II was a component-oriented phase designed to attack the problems in a particular kind of activity; Phase III was a follow-up and evaluation of Phase II.

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five-day program, including evenings, that excluded lectures and discussions of theory and concentrated on problem-solving, role-playing, and confrontation.

The Managerial Grid was first introduced in the Agency by

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promotion of the Grid program. In a January 1964 Midcareer course,

25X1

[redacted] gave a one-day summary and demonstration of the Grid, and thereafter the full five-day program was given several times for Agency Officers at the GS-15 and supergrade levels. The full development of the Grid came after 1965 and is thus not within the time span of this paper. It should be noted here, however, that in November 1964 a "pilot project" for a trial running of Phase II of the Grid was authorized, and the Office of Finance was selected as the component in which the program would be conducted. This pilot project continued at intervals throughout 1965; but it was not completed and evaluated until July 1966, 127/ and the overall project is best discussed in a later paper.

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E. Summary and Evaluation

During the 1956-66 period the MTF -- more than any of the other Intelligence School faculties -- made great strides in the development of training programs. At the beginning of the period, courses in management and supervision were part-time, in-house programs without noticeable prestige and without detectable support from senior Agency officials. By the end of the period, management training had become a major concern to the Executive Director-Comptroller and the DDS and had aroused the personal interest of the DDCI and the DCI.

25X1 Funds for the expensive [redacted] and Managerial Grid courses were readily available; the active participation of the Deputy Directors came to be a reality; and the doctrine of management training had become an essential part of the career development concept.

To what extent the surge in management training activities actually improved management practices in the Agency is a matter of question -- and, perhaps, opinion. [redacted], the MTF chief who initiated the surge, always had a tongue-in-cheek attitude towards the practical application of the principles and methods taught in the courses -- an attitude shared by [redacted] the chief of the Intelligence School throughout the period. [redacted] who followed

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25X1 [redacted] in the chief's position and who tried very hard to get greater DDP participation in management training, became disenchanted with the job and stayed for less than half of his planned two-year rotational 25X1 assignment. [redacted] who followed [redacted] and stayed 25X1 in the job for six years thereafter, had strong doubts about the practical effectiveness of management training and expressed them openly.\* Perhaps, of course, these people were too close to the trees and too concerned with trying to measure the immeasurable. In any event, to the senior officials of the Agency, apparently, the time, effort, and money spent on management training were well invested because management training -- by definition -- was good.

\* See Appendix A.

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### VIII. The Clerical Training Faculty

#### A. Background

The origin and early development of clerical training in the Agency is described in Volume I of this paper,\* and the continued development over the 1953-56 period is covered in Volume II.\*\* To reestablish continuity, the progress of clerical training from July 1951 to June 1956 is reviewed briefly here.

Before OTR was established in 1951, there was no clerical training program as such in the Agency. The Personnel Office ran a "clerical induction" activity as a part of the processing of newly recruited clerical personnel and also operated a skills testing activity, but neither of these was actually a training program. As the Agency began to expand rapidly early in 1951, there arose a need for "holding pools," devices that permitted clericals to come on board and on the payroll before they had been fully cleared. To make effective use of these pools, training activities were introduced. The result was

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\* See OTR-5, p. 45.

\*\* See OTR-6, p. 113.

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that by the end of 1951 OTR had established a Clerical Orientation program and a Clerical Refresher program and was providing most of the instruction for the personnel Office's Clerical Induction program.

In May 1952 the Clerical Induction program, including the testing phase, was turned over to OTR. Late in 1953, an Agency regulation made the Induction and Orientation programs mandatory for all new clerical personnel. By the end of 1953, the basic elements of the clerical training program -- the induction, orientation, and refresher courses -- had become well established; they continued to be the major clerical training courses throughout the period from 1953 to 1956.

In 1951 clerical training was a responsibility of TR(O), later TR(G). In December 1952 when the OTR Management Training Division was established, clerical training was assigned to that division. When the Basic Training School was established in December 1954, it assumed the clerical training responsibility; and in June 1956, when the Basic School was absorbed by the Intelligence School, clerical training became one of the components of the new school and in 1957 became the Clerical Training Faculty (CTF).

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25X1 Until June 1956 [redacted] had supervised clerical training activities along with some other programs in administrative 25X1 training. At that time, [redacted] took over the clerical 25X1 courses. In November 1956 [redacted] was reassigned to super- 25X1 vision training, and [redacted] became chief instructor of clerical training and later chief of the CTF. [redacted] remained in the position throughout the 1956-66 period and for many years thereafter. The number of people in the CTF varied at times, but usually there were from eight to ten full-time instructors and two training assistants.

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B. Major Programs

Essentially, the major programs conducted by the CTF during the 1956-66 period were those that had been established in earlier years. Although minor changes and improvements in the three courses -- induction, orientation, and refresher -- were constantly made, the basic objectives and substantive coverage stayed very much as they are described in Volumes I and II, and there is no need to re-cover that material here.

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It would be useful, however, to give some indication of the quantitative scope of the CTF's major activities. In fiscal year 1956, for example, 2,860 students received training in the three major courses.\* In the six months from March through August of 1958, more than 1,000 clericals took the courses. 128/ In fiscal year 1959 a total of 2,226 students were trained, 888 in the 40-hour clerical induction program, 913 in the 24-hour clerical orientation, and 425 in the 24-hour clerical refresher. 129/ The comparable figures for fiscal year 1960 were a total of 2,255; in clerical induction, 1,133; in clerical orientation, 760; and in clerical refresher, 363. 130/ Enrollments continued at this general level throughout in the 1956-66 period. The frequency of offerings of the three programs depended somewhat on the intake of new clericals and the demand for the refresher course. The induction program ran virtually back-to-back, with the largest enrollments during the summers. The orientation program, too, ran almost every week of the year; for example, in 1959 there were 43 runnings of the course. The refresher program, which was made up of several different segments, ran almost constantly, the segments often overlapping.

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\* See OTR-6, p. 113.

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Although EOD testing -- the giving of the Agency Qualifying Tests to clerical recruits -- was not a training activity, it was a continuing responsibility of the CTF after it was transferred to OTR from the Personnel Office in May 1952. The EOD testing was done at the beginning of the induction program. Failure to meet Agency standards in typing or shorthand did not disqualify the recruits for employment, but it often affected their starting GS grades. Theoretically, only qualified typists were recruited for typing jobs and people qualified in both typing and shorthand for stenographers' jobs. Actually, however, relatively few recruits were able to pass the tests satisfactorily. For example, a September 1958 report from the chief of the CTF to the deputy chief of the school stated that during the March through August period "Agency Qualifying Tests were given to entrance-on-duty employees in Clerical Induction Training. Of the 421 tested in type-writing, 172 met Agency qualifications (a net speed of 40 wpm). Of the 268 tested in shorthand, 27 met Agency qualifications (80 wpm for three minutes transcribed with five or fewer errors.)" 131/

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C. Special Activities

In addition to its work with the three major programs, the CTF was constantly engaged in special activities related in one way or another to clerical training. As early as 1954, for example, a course in "non-clerical typing" was introduced for Agency professional employees, including JOT's, who wanted to acquire a basic typing skill.\* By the end of 1958 the special non-clerical typing offerings had expanded to include a basic course, usually given before work hours, for non-JOT professionals; a basic course and a review course for JOT's; and a basic course for professionals in the Foreign Documents Division of the Office of Operations. 132/ Also in 1958 the CTF introduced programs of tutorial training in telephone usage and English usage for the on-duty clericals in any component of the Agency, and an "unofficial" testing program for on-duty clericals preparing for overseas assignments. 133/ In 1960 in conjunction with the Agency Records Management Staff, the CTF gave a series of refresher workshops in filing principles and techniques. 134/ During fiscal year 1961 a

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\* See OTR-6, p. 115. The CTF did not give a basic typing course for clerical personnel because, in principle, a typing skill was a condition for employment.

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special workshop in the techniques of dictating to a stenographer was given for middle-grade supervisors in the DDS; the chief of the CTF conducted some experimental training in "notehand" -- a kind of shorthand designed for personal use only; and a review course for writers of Anniversary Gregg shorthand was initiated. 135/

These special activities continued throughout the 1956-66 period, and new ones were introduced from time to time -- experimental training in the use of flexowriter and in the clerical aspects of automatic data processing, for example. The basic programs in induction, orientation, and refresher training, however, remained the major CTF responsibilities and required a major part of the faculty's efforts.

Even this brief account of the work of the CTF would not be complete without mention of housing and transportation problems with which the faculty had to cope. From 1951 to 1957 the clerical training programs were all given in the Potomac Park area -- induction in Curry Hall and orientation and refresher in Alcott Hall. This location was conveniently close to the DDP complex along the Reflecting Pool and within easy shuttle-service range of the E Street headquarters area. In 1957 a space squeeze sent the CTF and its activities to the upper floors of an old building at 1016 16th Street in downtown Washington, where the

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Office of Personnel conducted its application and EOD activities. This location increased dependence on shuttle service, now from both the E Street and Potomac Park areas.

With the opening of the new Headquarters Building in Langley in 1962, a real problem developed. Most of the personnel from the E Street area and all from the Reflecting Pool area moved to the new building; the shuttle trip from Langley to 16th Street required the better part of an hour, and on-duty personnel taking clerical training courses spent one-quarter of the working day in shuttle buses. The solution was, of course, to split the CTF. Those teaching the refresher course and handling some of the special activities worked in the new building -- where there was little suitable space, and those working in the induction and orientation programs stayed at 16th Street. This created all sorts of administrative and instructor-availability problems, and not infrequently special activities had to be dropped because of them. \* 136/

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\* In April 1967 the situation improved when the CTF, along with a number of other Agency components, moved from 16th Street to the Ames Building in Rosslyn.

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D. Summary and Evaluation

Clerical training in the Agency is unique in that its basic elements, the three major programs, were established by need very early and did not change materially thereafter. The quantitative aspects of the need changed as the Agency grew, but the nature of the need remained constant. Actually, the many special activities of the CTF were all supplementary aids to the fundamental objective -- to prepare clerical personnel for service in the Agency and to provide the means of improving the skills of clerical personnel after they entered on duty.

The fact that clerical training never acquired much prestige in the Agency is probably inherent in the nature and level of the training. There was also, probably, a factor of professional snobbery involved. An unhappy but understandable result of this lack of status was the relatively low grade levels of the members of the CTF. For most of the years of the 1956-66 period, the chief's position was a GS-11; all of the other faculty chiefs in the school were GS-14's or GS-15's. The clerical training instructors had difficulty reaching the GS-09 grade, regardless of their experience and competence; most of the other instructors in the school were in the GS-12 to GS-14 range.

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The Chief of the Intelligence School, supported by Mr. Baird, constantly tried to raise the grade levels in the CTF; he had little success because the Agency component that had jurisdiction in such matters insisted on equating the CTF instructors with teachers of commercial subjects in the public secondary schools.

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The failure to raise the status of the CTF did not, however, lower the quality of clerical training. Both Mr. Baird, the Director of Training, and [redacted] the chief of the school, were convinced that the CTF had developed the most effective clerical training program in government; and they frequently said so.

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## IX. The Operations Support Faculty

The early development of training courses in the support of clandestine operations is described in Volume I of this paper,\* and subsequent progress up to June of 1956 is described in Volume II.\*\* In the interest of continuity, that coverage is reviewed briefly in this section before discussion of the major operations support programs and special activities conducted by the Operations Support Faculty (OSF) during the period from June 1956 to October 1962, when the OSF was transferred from the Intelligence School to the Operations School.\*\*\*

### A. Background

At some time in 1947 the training staff of the Agency's Office of Special Operations initiated a training course called the Field Administrative Course. Although there appears to be no record of the specific content of the course, it apparently consisted of training in the administrative support of field operations and was the first course in the "operations support" category. Early in 1949 the name was

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\* See OTR-5, p. 78.

\*\* See OTR-6, p. 130.

\*\*\* See above, p. 11.

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changed to the Administrative Course, and in November of 1954 it became Administrative Procedures. 137/ The second program devised to support operations was the Staff Indoctrination Course, started in December 1950. This course continued through 46 runnings until April 1953, when it was discontinued. In June 1953 a new course, Administrative Support, was initiated, and in November 1954 the name of that course was changed to Operations Support.

The third course in the support category, Interviewing and Reporting, was introduced in 1951 and continued, with four runnings each year, until June 1956, when it was transferred to the Operations School and became Information Reporting, Reports, and Requirements (IRR). When the operations support training group became a part of the Intelligence School in the June 1956 reorganization of OTR, then, their program consisted of two courses, Administrative Procedures and Operations Support.

When OTR was established in 1951, the operations support courses became the responsibility of the Management Training Division of TR(O), later TR(G). In the December 1953 reorganization, the responsibility was assigned to the Basic Training Division, later the Basic Training School. The courses continued to be offered in

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that component until June 1956. At that time [redacted] 25X  
who had previously been the supervisor of both support training and  
clerical training combined as "administrative training," was relieved  
of the clerical training responsibility and became chief instructor of  
the operations support group. In 1957 she became chief of the OSF  
and remained in that position throughout the 1956-62 period. Mrs.

[redacted] instructor staff consisted of about [redacted] people, many of 25X  
whom were on rotational assignment from the DDS offices and the DDP  
area divisions and staffs. [redacted] herself, of course, had served  
overseas with the Agency in administrative support positions of respon-  
sibility.

B. Major Programs\*

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and describe solutions of the problems of administrative support of clandestine operations. The course was designed for "personnel concerned with administrative functions in support of the Clandestine Services . . . for officer personnel; however, those of the clerical level for whom increased responsibility and authority are imminent may be admitted." The course was divided into two parts, the Tradecraft Principles Phase and the Administrative Phase.

The content of the course consisted of lectures given by the OSF instructors and by guest speakers from the DDS and the DDP, case studies, films, seminars, and field problems. One of the field

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## 2. Administrative Procedures

The "Admin Procedures" course was a full-time, three-week (120 hours) program designed to "indoctrinate clerical personnel of the DDS, DDI, and DDP" in the basic procedures of administration in both headquarters offices and overseas stations. This course differed from the Ops Support course not only in objectives and the grade level of the students admitted but also in the fact that it was not limited to instruction in administrative procedures applied to clandestine activities. In other words, it was not really an "operations" support course.

This distinction was made clear by the division of the course into two parts -- Phase I, concerned with administrative procedures in overseas stations and bases. When there was clear justification, students were permitted to take only one of the phases of the course, but most students took the entire three-week program. The content of the course was related to regulations and procedures applicable to vouchered funds; administrative regulations and procedures covering travel, finance, and property accounting; dispatch, pouch, and cable procedures; and defensive security measures.

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A sampling of enrollment statistics again gives some measure of the importance of the course in the OSF program. In fiscal year 1959 the course was given six times for [redacted] students; 141/ and in fiscal year 1960 it was given seven times for [redacted] students. 142/ Unlike enrollments in the Ops Support course, enrollments in the Admin Procedures course were not much affected by the current DDP requirements for overseas support; Admin Procedures was a course that was taken by clerical personnel as a basic part of career development and an aid to advancement in grade.

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### 3. Budget and Finance Procedures

For some years before 1957 the Finance Division of the DDS had conducted a component course dealing with matters of budgeting, the use of funds, and financial accountability. Although some of these matters were touched upon in Ops Support and Admin Procedures courses, OTR had avoided duplication of the component course. Early in 1957 the Finance Division requested that the OSF develop a course to meet the specific needs of personnel assigned to finance duties at small overseas stations. 143

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The first running of the OTR course, Budget and Finance Procedures, began on 21 March 1957. The course was given for nine days, full time, in the classroom. Following the classroom phase, the students worked for one or two days under supervision in the Finance Division and with the budget and fiscal officers in the DDP Area Divisions to which they were assigned. The class was limited to 15 students, and much of the classroom instruction was done on an individual-student basis. Six runnings of the course were normally given each year for about 50 students. In 1959, for example, 51 took the course, 144/ and in 1960 there were 47 students. 145/ There were times, however, when special runnings of the course were required. In fiscal year 1961, for example, eight extra runnings were given to meet the requirements of the rapid expansion of the DDP Africa Division's field activities. 146/

C. Special Activities

Like the other faculties in the Intelligence School, the OSF was constantly engaged in special activities, some of them related to the major programs of the faculty and some of them directed toward

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other services. Perhaps the best indication of the nature and scope of these special activities is contained in a 1958 report from the chief of the faculty to the Deputy chief of the school.\*

D. Summary and Evaluation \*\*

The OSF, perhaps more than any of the other faculties of the Intelligence School, was forced to maintain close and constant liaison with the non-OTR components of the Agency that it served -- primarily the DDS and the DDP. Practices and procedures of supporting operational activities in the field were always changing. Requirements for support could not be anticipated with any degree of accuracy; areas of emphasis changed without warning, and new operational targets appeared suddenly, with the consequent sudden requirements for operational support. All of these problems the OSF handled in stride, principally

25X1 because [redacted] the chief of the faculty, had close ties with senior officers in both the DDS and the DDP and because competent, experienced officers from the DDS and the DDP were always on rotational assignment in the faculty.

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\* See Appendix C.

\*\* The opinions expressed here are those of [redacted] who was Chief of the Intelligence School after 1958 and throughout the period that the OSF was a component of the school.

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Because the chief of the school had no experience in the intricate problems of operations support, he gave [redacted] full authority to handle her faculty's responsibilities, including the selection of rotational-assignment instructors, as she saw fit. The high degree of acceptability and professional respect that the faculty achieved during the 1956-62 period completely justified his confidence in [redacted] ability.

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X. Summary and Conclusions

During the 1956-66 period the Intelligence School developed from a sort of catch-all, odds-and-ends department to a closely integrated organization of faculties, each with its own specific responsibilities but all with a clearly articulated devotion to the overall mission of the school. The growth of the school, determined largely by the growth of the individual faculties, was largely in the degree of sophistication and responsibility achieved.

The duties of the Orientation and Briefing Officer changed from routine briefings and participation in orientation programs arranged by other Agency components to major responsibilities in the management and planning of VIP briefings and non-Agency group orientations. The Intelligence Orientation Faculty developed the Intelligence Products exhibit, the Support exhibit, the high-level Intelligence Review course, and the plans for the Midcareer course. The Intelligence Production Faculty, beginning in 1956 with only a few skills courses, developed the sophisticated research courses, including the photointelligence course, and two of the major segments of the JOT program. The Management Training Faculty's program went from two basic courses in middle-level management and supervision to the [redacted] and [redacted]

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Managerial Grid courses for senior Agency officers. The Clerical Training Faculty not only maintained its basic training service but also introduced new programs for both clerical and professional personnel. The Operations Support Faculty made steady progress in the responsiveness of its major programs to operational needs and achieved a high degree of professional acceptance in the DDS and the DDP.

Understandably, perhaps, there was in OTR and in some other components of the Agency, a basic misconception about the role of the Intelligence School-- the concept that the school represented the DDI "presence" in OTR in the same way that the Operations School represented the DDP presence. This, of course, was not true in any sense. Although some of the school's courses were related to intelligence processing and production, most of them were designed to meet Agency-wide requirements for training in orientation, management, support, and basic skills. Enrollment figures throughout the 1956-66 period show that DDI personnel constituted less than one-fourth of the annual enrollments in Intelligence School courses. To what, if any, extent this misconception affected the quality of the training provided by the school is an unanswerable question. It was, however, directly responsible for the early 1966 fragmentation of the Intelligence School when

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the Management and Clerical faculties were transferred to the Support School, which was established on the fallacious rationale that because there was a DDP presence (the Operations School) and a DDI presence (the Intelligence School) in OTR, there should also be a DDS presence (the Support School).

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## Appendix A

### Review of Agency Management Training

28 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT : Review of Agency Management Training

#### I. INTRODUCTION

This report is for information only. It was compiled in answer to your request of 16 January 1964. It reviews the history of management training in the Agency, indicates its current situation and future prospects. Attached charts show the trend of enrollments and the distribution by components.

#### II. HISTORY

A. Management training in the Agency was begun by [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] with the so-called Human Resources Program, a 4 1/2 - hour conference which was attended by many senior officials in the Agency.

The first management course was given by [redacted] in January 1954. It was a 40-hour course given part-time for two weeks. It surveyed processes and problems of supervision and mid-management for support personnel. Although it used some cases, it was primarily a lecture course which featured presentations by the Auditor-in-Chief, the Director of Personnel, and six other guest speakers.

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B. By August 1954 a course in supervision was being planned for people directly in charge of working level groups. The course plan emphasized the traditional functions of directing, coordinating, planning, and controlling. In the fall of 1954 basic courses in supervision

25X1 [redacted]

C. From this beginning until the present day the management training has been given by three instructors except for 1962 when there were four and 1963 when there were two. Chart I shows periods of service of the various instructors to date.

D. Beginning in 1956 and for several years thereafter the scheduled offerings were considerably augmented by a number of special courses requested by various components such as ORR, SR, OSI, and the Office of Communications. These courses were not essentially different from the regularly scheduled ones but were tailored to some extent to meet special requirements.

E. Over the years the training techniques have gradually changed in the direction of eliminating lectures and introducing active learning. In December 1957 the use of textbooks was abandoned and the reading of selected articles substituted. By 1958 films were being used as cases and illustrative material, and several films were made by [redacted] of OTR, one of which is still being used. Also in 1958 a very successful innovation was introduced, namely the "In-basket Exercise" which was developed by the A&E Staff of OTR in conjunction with outside consultants. This "In-basket Exercise" is still in use. Also, at this time role-playing became an important technique of instruction.

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F. In September 1959 Colonel White's expressed interest in the development of a senior management seminar led to the two-week seminar given by [redacted] for senior Agency 25X1 managers at [redacted] in October 1960 and again in October 1961.

G. In June 1961 a similar seminar conducted by [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] was offered for a slightly lower level (GS-14 and 15). It was offered again in June 1962 and June 1963.

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H. In May 1961 the first full-time course was given, but courses were generally part-time until the fall of 1963 when the policy was inaugurated of having all management and supervisory courses on a full-time basis. At this time the decision was also made to take all courses for GS-11 and above either to [redacted] because of the greater effectiveness of the training given away from the distractions of home and office. Throughout the years, the courses have normally been of 40-hours duration.

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### III. ENROLLMENT

A. Chart II shows the number of employees who have taken any kind of management training since January 1955. This chart was compiled from a machine run of training records of currently employed individuals; training has been credited equally regardless of the length of any particular program, or the particular subject matter. External courses are counted equally with OTR courses in supervision and management. We do not have statistics on the number of supervisors and managers in each component, but it is obvious that some areas have not taken advantage of training opportunities.

B. DDP employees are shown in their present component, not in the one which entered them in training. This makes some difference in relative showings. For example, SR Division shows as of the end of 1963 twenty-eight GS-12's and above with some kind of management training, whereas a similar study in December 1962 showed forty-eight GS-12's and above in SR. Perusal of the chart shows the varying patterns associated with different offices, some going in heavily for the training of the lower grades and others concentrating on the higher levels.

C. Chart III shows the enrollment in OTR management and supervision courses over the past nine years. It is based on actual class rosters. (A statistical breakdown by courses for the years 1959-63 is also attached.) A drop-off became apparent in 1959, and there has been a slow decline since except for a slight pick-up in 1963. The drop-off in 1959 and again in 1961 shows up most clearly in the graph of the supervision courses. The drop-off in 1961 may possibly be related to the cancellation of the "five percent" regulation in 1960.

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The chart also shows a considerable decrease in DDI participation from 1960 on. (The total number in Chart III is larger than in Chart II because Chart II shows only people currently employed and counts each person only once regardless of the number of courses taken, but Chart III includes people no longer employed and each course taken is counted.) Chart III also shows that in 1963 enrollment was up from all components except DDP even though there were only two instructors during this year in contrast to the preceding year when there were four.

D. The records reveal some rather startling statistics which do not appear in the charts. In OTR management training (disregarding

25X1 the [redacted] courses):

1. OCI has not entered a student since 1956;
2. Since 1957 only one student has been entered from the CI Staff;
3. WE Division has entered two students since 1957;
4. WH Division has entered three since 1958;
5. After 1958 only two came from the PP Staff and only one from the IO Division;
6. The Africa Division has entered one since 1960.

E. In OTR supervision courses:

1. OCI has entered only four students since 1959;
2. Other than RI Division there have been only seven students from DDP since 1960.

F. The charts demonstrate the low degree of participation by DDP over the years, a chronic situation which was noted as early as 25X1 1955 by [redacted]. It is true of external offerings as well as internal ones. Not even the senior seminars had drawing power; in 25X1 the last seminar conducted by [redacted] there were only four students

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X1 from DDP, and the [ ] seminars were given up when it became established that DDP participation could not be counted on. The cause is not readily identified. In part it is related to the views of some senior officials who fail to recognize that such training has any validity, relevance or necessity. We instructors have occasionally heard from DDP employees that they would like to get management training but that either they were not aware of the management offerings or that they were unable to get permission to take the courses. It has been frequently said that the Clandestine Services are too hard pressed to be able to spare anyone for this type of training, but the Office of Communications, also hard pressed, has made a regular policy of putting their people through management and supervision courses and has even requested special courses for particular groups.

X1 G. In December 1961 [ ] initiated an effort to work out an operations management course tailored to assumed DDP needs. This did not get beyond the talking stage, and there is no indication that it would have been accepted. In October 1962 [ ] expressed interest in a course of three or four days duration which might be given to all DDP branch chiefs. At his request, a proposal was submitted, but no reply or comment was ever received and no action ever taken.

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#### IV. COURSE CONTENT AND TECHNIQUES

A. Many books and innumerable articles have been published about management training, but there has never been any agreement as to methods or content. From the time of [ ] OTR training has increasingly centered its attention on the management of people, which seems to be the critical problem, and gradually eliminated the study of such topics as work methods, office and records management, and theory of organization, for which there has been no demand in our programs. Our courses currently are centered on problems of leadership, communication, motivation, and decision-making.

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B. There is good reason to doubt the lasting effect of conventional teaching in this field. Published reports show that many training programs have had only temporary effect on the students, who accept the content of the programs but are not really able to change their habitual

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ways of thinking and doing. We have found that many students are unable to relate theoretical considerations and outside cases to their own situation. They have followed the course closely, analyzed the cases astutely, but their managerial behavior was actually changed in no way by the training. In these cases, the influencing of attitudes becomes more important than the imparting of knowledge or the teaching of skills.

C. Others are unable to practice what they have learned because of the managerial climate in their unit as set by their boss. Most professional trainers have come to believe that management training cannot be effective unless it starts with the top managers and proceeds down. To this extent [redacted] was correct in attempting to indoctrinate the top managers in CIA with his Human Resources Program before commencing any other training. The most common remark our students make is, "I wish my boss would take this course."

D. The "Case Method" has increasingly been used in OTR training, in large part because of its effect on attitudes and insights. We instructors got many valuable tips from watching [redacted] and 25X1 [redacted] use this method. Without going into an analysis of the case method it may be said that although we still believe it has considerable merit, we have come to have some doubts about it. In too many instances case discussions have been simply an exchange of views, with no real impact on the students. We have experimented with Agency cases, State Department cases, business cases, and have rewritten some in an Agency setting. While the business cases often seem too remote to the students, the Agency cases seem equally remote to some and have too many emotional associations for others.

E. Our experience shows that the students learn most from active situations and exercises. For example, the "Communication Game" has been used very successfully for a number of years to drive home certain valuable lessons. We do not know of a better exercise of this type anywhere in government or in business training circles. We instructors administered this exercise for the Industrial College Faculty in the summer of 1963 where it was very well received.

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F. We have also used "Role-playing" in varying degrees. This is a technique which is much used by management trainers. Students who get drawn into role-playing usually feel that this was the most valuable part of their training.

G. Our "In-basket Exercise" is given to all classes except the GS 5-10 level. This is an exercise not in the pushing of paper but in the analyzing of problems and coming to decisions on a variety of managerial situations. This exercise is usually regarded as the highlight of our course by most students, and we have been experimenting with techniques to expand its effectiveness. We believe our in-basket is superior to that used by the Veterans Administration and other organizations.

H. We have also looked into the matter of using a computerized managerial game. Discussions have been held with System Development Corporation on their simulation programs. This technique has become quite popular in business management training and is being used by the Army Management School as well. It is our belief that such a game would be quite valuable as an instructional device; however, it might cost as much as \$50,000 in consultant fees to develop.

I. The most effective approach we have come across up to now is the so-called "Managerial Grid" originated by [redacted] at [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] and used by him very successfully in some large corporations. This is a five-day program in which the instructor guides the activities of the students in small groups. It embodies active learning about management with very little theory, and the students find out a great deal about themselves, the way they affect other people, and the way they can get things done. In the last Mid-Career Course

25X1 [redacted] gave a one-day synopsis of the "Managerial Grid"; the students found this extremely worth while and wanted to know more. We tried the same thing with a group of GS-11's and 12's recently, and again it seemed to have very considerable impact. While the "Managerial Grid" does not cover all facets of management, we are beginning to believe it is the method most likely to have genuine and lasting training value.

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V. CURRENT PLANS

A. We are now proposing to stage a five-day seminar for GS-15's and 16's in May to consist entirely of the "Managerial Grid". If this proves to be as successful as we have reason to expect, we shall then propose that this be the pattern of management training in the future at all levels. As the work load permitted, we would then like to make special offerings on selected topics to the extent possible as refresher or advanced programs for those who have had basic management training.

B. We also would like to develop some ideas we have for films. 25X1 Talks have been held with [redacted] regarding the production of one or more films in the general area of Agency supervision and management. It is our belief that the first of these films might very well deal with the topic of fitness reports.

C. Another project we have had in mind for several years has been a lecture series to be held in the Headquarters Auditorium, but this has been kept in abeyance as long as we had only two instructors. We are now inclined to doubt the value of such a program, especially if it costs money.

D. Another current activity is our participation in the Mid-Career Course. Our one-week presentation in the first of these classes, though not unsuccessful, did not really belong in this course as neither the method nor the content fitted well into the general conception of the course. For the second running our contribution was cut to three days, a substantial portion of which was devoted to the "Managerial Grid." This presentation was much more successful, but there is still substantial doubt in our minds as to the appropriateness of a management phase in this course. We are currently of the belief that basic management training should be a prerequisite for the Mid-Career Course which should then include a few discussions of Agency management by top managers within the general context of discussion of other Agency problems.

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## VI. COST AND T/O

A. As shown in Chart I, management training has operated over the years with three instructors, with the exception of 1962 when there were four and of 1963 when there were only two. At the present scale of activity four instructors are hardly needed, but the load is rather heavy for two and there is little opportunity for development of new materials and methods. A staff of two also represents no reserve; if one should get sick, it might be necessary to cancel a course. Two instructors might be sufficient if most of the teaching follows the "Managerial Grid" scheme of instruction since it does not require very heavy participation by the instructors. On balance a staff of three instructors seems about right.

B. Ideally, it would be desirable to have as instructors one careerist from DDI, one from DDS, and one from DDP. Throughout 1963 an unsuccessful attempt was made to obtain an instructor from DDP. Of our current staff one instructor is from DDI, one from DDS&T, and one from OTR. There has been evidence of reluctance to participate in this kind of instruction because of a feeling that it is something of a blind alley which will not forward one's career.

C. While we feel that our instruction is good, we wish to point out that it is very difficult to find experienced instructors with a background in professional management. Of the six instructors added to the staff 25X1 since 1959, only one [redacted] had experience in teaching previously, and their managerial training and background were "spotty" at best.

D. To abolish the staff and conduct this instruction by contract or by external training would be much more expensive than the present arrangement and in our view less effective for most employees. Nevertheless, a certain amount of contracting will be necessary in any case if we are to pursue this "Managerial Grid", inasmuch as that material is copyrighted and closely controlled. If this method proves to be as good as we expect, we believe we can come to some arrangement with the originators of the material. While it might be necessary to bring 25X1 in [redacted] for the senior level of the Agency, this instruction could be handled for other levels by the present staff.

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E. We have not had an opportunity to make a comparison with the management training efforts of other agencies and companies but believe our program is a relatively modest one. About \$14,000 was budgeted for FY 1963 (in addition to salaries); this was about half of the FY 1962 budget, and not all of this was spent. The amount for FY 1964 is about the same. The main costs are for external training for instructors, hiring of consultants, and purchase of in-basket material, films, reprints, and professional books.

F. The staff currently consists of three GS-15's and one GS-8. A GS-6 slot was eliminated by us as unessential at the end of 1962. A total staff of three in 1963 taught as many students as a staff of six did in the preceding year. While the present teaching staff is able to handle the current and projected load, any dramatic upswing probably would necessitate some adjustment in T/O and in program. We prefer to delay any recommendations until after we see how well [redacted] seminar on the "Managerial Grid" is received next May.

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[redacted]  
Chief, Management Training Faculty, IS/TR

Attachments

As stated above

CONCURRENCE: /s/ 2 March 1964  
Director of Training Date

X1 OTR/IS [redacted] mam (28 February 1964)

Distribution:

Orig & 2 - Addressee

- 1 - DTR
- 1 - C/IS/TR
- 2 - MTF/IS/TR w/o charts

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MANAGEMENT TRAINING FACULTY ACTIVITIES

1959

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COURSE</u>	<u>GRADE LEVEL</u>	<u>NO. STUDENTS</u>	<u>DDS</u>	<u>DDI</u>	<u>DDP</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
<u>SUPERVISION</u>							
19-30 Jan	Supervision #46	5-9	17	6	5	6	
16-20 Feb	Introduction to Supervision #5	5-8	18	8	7	2	1
9-20 Mar	Supervision #47	9-12	15	8	7		
30 Mar-10 Apr	Supervision #48	12-14	18	6	10	2	
27 Apr-8 May	Supervision #49	9-13	14	7	6	1	
11-15 May	Supervision (Special)		13	13 (ISO)			
8-19 June	Supervision #50	5-7	13	3	7	3	
5-16 Oct	Supervision #51	5-9	18	5	7	3	3
26 Oct-6 Nov	Supervision #52	(Canceled)					
7-18 Dec	Supervision #53	(Canceled)					
7-18 Dec	Supervision in Research and Analysis	11-13	11 137	56	10 59	1 18	4
<u>MANAGEMENT</u>							
5-16 Jan	Management #49	11-13	12	3	8	1	
2-13 Feb	Management #50	12-14	14	4	9	1	
24 Feb-6 Mar	Management #51	11-13	12	5	6	1	

MANAGEMENT TRAINING FACULTY ACTIVITIES

1959

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COURSE</u>	<u>GRADE LEVEL</u>	<u>NO. STUDENTS</u>	<u>DDS</u>	<u>DDI</u>	<u>DDP</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
<u>MANAGEMENT (Continued)</u>							
9-23 Mar	Management Conference #1 (COMMO)	14-16	15	15			
23 Mar-6 Apr	Management Conference #2 (COMMO)	14-16	15	15			
13-24 Apr	Management #52	13-16	13	7	4	2	
4-8 May	Management Special (OSI #4)	11-17	18		18 (17 OSI, 1 ORR)		
25 May-5 Jun	Management #53	8-15	14	6	5	3	
31 Aug-11 Sep	Management #54	11-13	7	5	1	1	
27-30 Oct	Management Conference		25		25 (OO)		
9-20 Nov	Management #55	14-15	8	5	2	1	
30 Nov-11 Dec	Management #56	11-13	10	6	3	1	
			163	71	81	11	
	YEARLY TOTAL		300	127	140	29	4

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MANAGEMENT TRAINING FACULTY ACTIVITIES

1960

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COURSE</u>	<u>GRADE LEVEL</u>	<u>NO. STUDENTS</u>	<u>DDS</u>	<u>DDI</u>	<u>DDP</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
<u>SUPERVISION</u>							
4-15 Jan	Supervision #54	(Canceled)					
1-12 Feb	Supervision #55	11-12	12	5	7		
23-24 Feb	Supervision (Special)	5-12	10				10 (Cable Sec)
29 Feb-1 Mar	Supervision (Special)	5-12	9				9 (Cable Sec)
165	Supervision (Special)	8-9	10	10	10 (COMMO)		
7-11 Mar	Supervision (Special)	8-9	10	10	10 (COMMO)		
14 Mar	Supervision (Special)	8-10	9	9	9 (COMMO)		
4-15 Apr	Supervision #56	5-9	14	4	8	2	
2-13 May	Supervision #57	5-9	16	4	7	5	
23-27 May	Survey of Supervision and Management	11-13	17	6	6	5	
6-17 Jun	Supervision #58	11-12	11	7	1	3	
10-21 Oct	Supervision #59	6-9	14	7	1	6	
5-16 Dec	Supervision #60	11-12	18	11	4	3	
			150	73	34	24	19

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MANAGEMENT TRAINING FACULTY ACTIVITIES

1960

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COURSE</u>	<u>GRADE LEVEL</u>	<u>NO. STUDENTS</u>	<u>DDS</u>	<u>DDI</u>	<u>DDP</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
<u>MANAGEMENT (Continued)</u>							
18-29 Jan	Management #57	14-15	18	6	8	3	1
15-26 Feb	Management #58	11-13	18	10	7	1	
18-29 Apr	Management #59	11-13	13	9	1	3	
9-20 May	Management Conference	11-14	10			10 (SR)	
20 Jun-1 Jul	Management #60	12-15	14	9	3	2	
26 Sep-7 Oct	Management #61	11-13	19	11	4	4	
10-21 Oct	Senior Management Seminar (Bailey)	15-18	35	13	11	9	2
24 Oct-4 Nov	Management #62	13-15	12 139	7 65	4 38	1 33	3
YEARLY TOTAL			289	138	72	57	22

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MANAGEMENT TRAINING FACULTY ACTIVITIES

1961

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COURSE</u>	<u>GRADE LEVEL</u>	<u>NO. STUDENTS</u>	<u>DDS</u>	<u>DDI</u>	<u>DDP</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
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SUPERVISION

23 Jan-3 Feb	Supervision #61	5-9	15	7	4	4	
27 Feb-10 Mar	Supervision #62	9-14	14	8	6		
10-21 Apr	Supervision #63	5-9	12	5	2	5	
19-30 Jun	Supervision #64	(Merged w/Management #67)					
25 Sep-6 Oct	Supervision #65	5-8	10	4	2	4	
13-22 Nov	Supervision #66	(Canceled)					
4-15 Nov	Suprevision #67	10-13	15 66	9 33	5 19	1 14	

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MANAGEMENT

9-20 Jan	Management #63	11-13	15	11	4	
6-17 Feb	Management #64	14-15	18	10	2	6
24-28 Apr	Management #65	12-13	9	3	3	3
1-12 May	Management #66	14-15	11	7	2	2
11-17 Jun	Seminar in Management Practices	14-15	30	8	11	9
19-30 Jun	Management #67	11-13	16	10	4	2
31 Jul-4 Aug	Management Conference	11-13	22	22 (COMMO)		

MANAGEMENT TRAINING FACULTY ACTIVITIES

1961

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COURSE</u>	<u>GRADE LEVEL</u>	<u>NO. STUDENTS</u>	<u>DDS</u>	<u>DDI</u>	<u>DDP</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
<u>MANAGEMENT (Continued)</u>							
11-22 Sep	Management #68	11-13	15	9	2	4	
16-28 Oct	Senior Management Seminar (Bailey)	15-Super Grade	33	14	11	8	
30 Oct-9 Nov	Management #69	14-15	<u>10</u> <u>179</u>	<u>5</u> <u>99</u>	<u>2</u> <u>37</u>	<u>3</u> <u>41</u>	<u>2</u>
	YEARLY TOTAL		245	132	56	55	2

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MANAGEMENT TRAINING FACULTY ACTIVITIES

1962

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COURSE</u>	<u>GRADE LEVEL</u>	<u>NO. STUDENTS</u>	<u>DDS</u>	<u>DDI</u>	<u>DDP</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
<u>SUPERVISION</u>							
22 Jan-2 Feb	Supervision #68	5-9	15	6	5	4	
19-30 Mar	Supervision #69	10-12	9	7	2		
23 Apr-4 May	Supervision #70	(Canceled)					
11-22 Jun	Supervision #71	5-9	15	4	5	6	
24 Sep-5 Oct	Supervision #72	11-12 (1 GS 7)	12	5	7		
29 Oct-9 Nov	Supervision #73	5-9	17	9	5	2	1
			68	31	24	12	1
169							
<u>MANAGEMENT</u>							
8-13 Jan	Management #70	13-14	15	5	5	5	
5-16 Feb	Management #71	11-13	15	11	2	2	
26 Feb-3 Mar	Management #72	14-15	17	5	5	7	
23 Apr-4 May	Management #73	10-13	14	6	6	2	
14-25 May	Management #74	14-15	7	3	2	2	
24-30 Jun	Seminar in Management Practices	14-Super Grade	30	11	10	6	3
10-21 Sep	Management #75	(Canceled)					
14-20 Oct	Management #76	14-15 (1 GS-13 17 OTR)		10	3	4	
3-14 Dec	Management #77	11-13	20 135	13 64	5 38	2 30	3
	<u>YEARLY TOTAL</u>		203	95	62	42	4

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MANAGEMENT TRAINING FACULTY ACTIVITIES

1963

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COURSE</u>	<u>GRADE LEVEL</u>	<u>NO. STUDENTS</u>	<u>DDS</u>	<u>DDI</u>	<u>DDP</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
<u>SUPERVISION</u>							
14-25 Jan	Supervision #74	(Canceled)					
25 Mar-5 Apr	Supervision #75	(Canceled)					
25-29 Mar	Supervision #76 (Special)	8-11	12	12 (COMMO)			
8-12 Apr	Supervision #77 (Special)	5-9	14	12 (COMMO) 2			
17 <sup>0</sup> 6-17 May	Supervision #78	5-10	27	6	11	5	5
30 Sep-4 Oct	Supervision #79	5-10	15	8	3	3	1
9-13 Dec	Supervision #80	5-10	24	13	4	3	4
			92	51	20	.11	10

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MANAGEMENT

4-15 Feb	Management #78	(Canceled)					
3-15 Mar	Management #79	11-13	22	11	7	4	
24-30 Jun	Seminar in Management Practices	14-16	34	9	15	3	7
9-10 Jul	JOT Seminar		14	14			
12-18 Oct	Midcareer	13-14	30	7	10	9	4
4-8 Nov	Management #80	11-13	22	8	10	2	2
18-22 Nov	Management #81	(Canceled)					
			122	49	42	18	13
	<u>YEARLY TOTAL</u>		213	101	60	28	24

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Appendix B

Colonel White's Briefing of [redacted]

25>

11 May 1961

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Colonel White's Briefing of [redacted] on Friday, 5 May

25>

X1      1. Col. White briefed [redacted] in the former's office in the  
X1 presence of [redacted] and myself. I had  
X1 provided, first by phone and then on a briefing sheet, notes of Dr.  
[redacted] previous briefing by the Inspector General and suggestions for  
items to be covered in Col. White's discussion. (He made no reference  
to the former, although he did cover some of the same ground and he  
did use our suggestions regarding emphasis on communications and  
"what was right with the Agency" as opposed to the Inspector General's  
briefing which had inevitably put a heavier emphasis on what was  
wrong.) Col. White had before him a fairly detailed organization chart  
of the CIA which he referred to during the briefing.

2. Col. White began by saying that there was a certain resist-  
ance -- particularly in the DDI and DDP, but also present in the DDS --  
among senior people to being "lectured on management by their con-  
temporaries." He then went on to say that Management tended to be  
equated in the DDI and DDP with "administration." These officers then  
wished to "wash their hands of it" in the sense of pushing such respon-  
sibilities on DDS officers detailed to the DDI and DDP. "In other words,"

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said Col. White, "management in this Agency connotes logistics, and most intelligence and operations officers incorrectly feel that it does not apply to their work."

3. This point was made again when Col. White said that there was a lack of understanding among operational and intelligence officers that they are managers. All of their work in one way or another involves the use of people and the most systematic way of learning to handle people, he thought, is through management courses.

4. The response of officers who had management training had been that this was fine but "how about getting at my boss."

5. Taking these things into consideration, Col. White had come to the conclusion that an outside course was necessary. He then went 25X1 on to describe the [redacted] He said that it had been an uphill battle all the way. The whole idea was foreign to intelligence and operations officers and yet, Col. White went on, he felt it was necessary to get management ideas across to the top people in this Agency.

6. Since as he had previously pointed out the senior officers resented being "lectured at" by their contemporaries, it was necessary -- since training was voluntary rather than obligatory -- to get qualified teachers and lecturers with university or other outside backgrounds. "The assumption was," said Col. White, "that if it were possible to demonstrate to top level personnel that management ideas were applicable to their work, it would then follow that these officers would tend to persuade their subordinate officers to come to our own internal management courses. The primary objective was to convince senior officers that they were managers." Col. White said that he felt the 36 officers who had attended the [redacted] now agree that this is so. The interest of a large number of officers was now aroused and while the Management Faculty of the Office of Training was "somewhat unhappy" at the idea, Col. White felt it was necessary to push ahead and take advantage of the momentum that had been gained.

25X

7. Col. White then pointed to the organization chart of the Agency and said that we were a big organization. There are roughly [redacted] 25X9 people in the DDS and DDP and [redacted] in the DDI. We nevertheless had

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no staff (by this he meant that there was no senior staff, at the DCI level.) The DDP and DDI were both strong personalities, and according to the chart there was relatively complete delegation of authority to them but "the DCI really doesn't delegate. " The point is," Col. White went on to say, "that the DCI doesn't respect or understand normal Agency channels as, for example, a military officer would. And," Col. White went on, "this is not a bad thing -- we are very flexible."

8. How then is the Agency run? "It is run," said Col. White, "in three meetings a week, with the DCI presiding and the DDP, DDI, DDS, the Inspector General, and various other senior officers present. That is where our policy guidance comes from and from that we are expected to get our jobs done."

9. Col. White then went on to say that as compared with the military "we have lots of paper but no real regulations." He explained that he meant by this that the regulations are primarily "administrative" and are not set up to give policy guidance -- which indeed they could not do, since our policy guidance changes day by day with the needs and crises that arise in various parts of the world.

10. Col. White then said that he has lots of responsibilities but that he must execute authority with a light touch. His channel to the DCI was mostly "on an oral basis."

11. These factors, explained Col. White, resulted in "the most informal organization I have ever seen." Again Col. White explained that this was not bad -- it made for the necessary flexibility.

12. Summarizing to this point in the briefing, Col. White said that this kind of organization resulted in an enormous emphasis on people, not on organization. The DCI goes to the individuals by name. Mr. Dulles knows who is expert on a given area by name, but he frequently does not know what a given person's title or organization function is." Again Col. White made the point that this results in the opposite of the stereotyped, bureaucratic organization man.

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25X1 13. At this point [redacted] remarked that he was soaking up this information like a sponge but he was a little concerned about communications in an organization such as Col. White described. Col. White admitted that this was a major problem and it was further complicated by security restrictions -- the need to know. This further countered the organization's communications needs. "It may be that we have carried this too far." Nevertheless the result was an extreme reliance on individuals, and the necessity for those individuals to understand how to handle people.

14. Col. White then went back into the history of the Agency and remarked that as organizations go we are relatively young. "People have risen fast." He said that they have not had the opportunity to be trained in the handling of people in management except by their own experience on the job. We have few checklist types here. Once again, said Col. White, this made for flexibility and it was flexibility that this Agency must have.

15. Since he had emphasized strengths to this point, Col. White said that he would like to say a word about weaknesses. The outstanding weakness, in his opinion, was the reluctance of line managers to accept total responsibility of their people on and off the job. (This was a point the IG had made at considerable length). It was imperative that this weakness be remedied, particularly as senior officers do not have as great an appreciation of this need as, in Col. White's opinion, we should have.

16. What about the motivation of the people in this organization? It was very high. In part this was due to the glamour of the work, to excitement, to "being on the firing line -- we are at war." On the other hand, there was a tendency (which again Col. White mentioned as a weakness of certain senior officers) to refuse to face the fact of incompetent people. There are not enough people saying, "Joe, you are not cutting the mustard."

17. How then would officers who had incompetent subordinates handle the problem? They tended to use the medical staff, security, "anything to get rid of bad ones." He then went on to say that a

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traditional method had been to give a man a good fitness report and transfer him off to another part of the Agency. The tight personnel situation at the present time made this less and less effective.

18. "Another thing," said Col. White, "has been that our people have not been trained to leave their problems at the office." The military officers were. He said that he did not know what [redacted] could do about this situation, but that if he had any ideas he should "put them across to the officers." 25X

19. Col. White said that we are probably not badly managed -- just "informal." He went on to say that he recognized the danger that we as an organization might become too bureaucratic. At this point, 25X1 [redacted] said that he was somewhat concerned about getting the class he would be dealing with to participate vigorously with the cases and materials that he would be dealing with. [redacted] Col. White and I assured him that there would not be a lack of participation but rather very vigorous participation. Col. White used the expression, "In general, we are an Agency of fearless people." He said this in a rather rueful way and went on to explain that division chiefs and officers at lower levels did not hesitate to speak up in major policy meetings and disagree vigorously, both with Mr. Dulles and with each other. 25X

20. Col. White said that if there is a single lesson with which he would like to see the students leave the course, it was that there are "no absolutes." He went on to explain that he meant by this that in management there are no such things as checklists or correct principles to set forth and he further said that there is no "rule book." As a secondary objective, Col. White told [redacted] that he hoped that the students of this course would want their subordinates to get similar training. 25X

21. On several occasions Col. White emphasized to [redacted] that the substance of the course was [redacted] affair. In connection with this, Col. White said that the OTR management faculty would stand by to help him in any way possible but that "the course is your business." 25X 25

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25X1 22. At [redacted] suggestion, Col. White then said a few words  
25X1 about the "hump" and Regulation [redacted]. The import of his remarks was  
that the Agency must stay young because of the nature of its business.  
(Col. White qualified this by saying that this was a particular require-  
ment of the DDP.)

23. In connection with the DDI, DDS, DDP, Col. White said that  
unquestionably the DDP seemed to possess the greatest esprit de corps.  
The DDI people tended in general to be specialists in certain fields and  
to have a greater loyalty to their subject matter than to the organiza-  
tion. As such Col. White said that he would like to see more AGENCY  
esprit de corps and greater homogeneity.

25X1 24. At this point, [redacted] said that he has set himself four goals  
in this course: (a) to make the students understand that they are man-  
agers, (b) to demonstrate, by the case method and other ways, certain  
attitudes that appear to be typical of good managers, (c) to make the  
students see in various ways that management cannot proceed by rules  
and (d) to help the students to think openly about management problems.

25X1 25. Col. White approved these goals and said "Above all, the man-  
ager is a trainer." [redacted] then inquired rather belligerently  
whether Col. White would be down to open the course. Col. White said  
that he would do so if his schedule permitted. [redacted] said that the  
best way to demonstrate to the students that management was an impor-  
tant factor in the Agency was to get the "high brass" involved in the  
25X1 sponsorship of this course. [redacted] then went on to say that in his  
estimation Col. White responded with a smile that he is probably the  
25X1 highest brass that [redacted] would have a chance to get to participate  
and then he agreed to come down to open the course on the morning of  
12 June.

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Appendix C

Operations Support Faculty Activity Report,

March through August 1958

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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*Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT*

TO : Deputy Chief, Intelligence School

DATE: 24 September 1953

FROM : Chief, Operations Support Faculty

SUBJECT: Activity Report - March through August 1953

REF : Memorandum of 17 September 1953. Subject: Report  
to President's Board of Consultants on Foreign  
Intelligence Activities (Killian Committee).

Attached in our activity report as requested in referenced  
memorandum.



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OPERATIONS SUPPORT FACULTY

PERIODIC REPORT OF ACTIVITIES

(1 March 1953 thru 31 August 1953)

Courses: Operations Support, Administrative Procedures, Budget and Finance  
Procedures.

1. Nine courses have been run during this period with a total of [ ] students. This includes the Administrative Procedures course presented at [ ]

25X1

25X9

2. Administrative Procedures has been revised to excise those subjects that more appropriately belong in Clerical Training. As it is currently constituted, Administrative Procedures Phase I consists of two weeks of headquarters support subjects; Phase II concentrates on overseas subjects. Our goal is to have all administrative personnel take the first two weeks shortly after they enter on duty. Phase II can then be taken shortly before leaving for overseas.

3. Lectures, discussions and critiques for all our courses have been taped with notations on each tape as to subject, instructor, length of lecture, date and course.

4. Plans had been made with [ ] A & E Staff, to review our course materials, lectures, tests and evaluations. This was in line with our projected course changes for the coming year. It has now been determined that [ ] will not be available until after the beginning of the year since he is involved with the current JOT program.

25X1

25X

5. The Faculty have been pursuing the proposal of flexowriter training requirements in liaison with [ ] of Clerical Training has been kept advised.

25X

6. The Faculty had a conference with [ ] (Operations School) regarding suggested changes in the next edition of the Tradecraft Manual. These changes, in some instances, were quite extensive and will be taken up with the editorial board when discussions have reached that stage.

25X

7. Our memorandum on the proposed course for Station Chiefs and a tentative course schedule has gone forward. Presumably this will be taken up by the Director of Training with the DDP persons concerned. The Regulations Digest for Small Field Stations which would be used in the proposed seminar has already been incorporated into our existing courses.

8. A staff study is being prepared by the officer handling DDP Clerical Personnel regarding a specialized training course for all clericals hired for

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25X9

overseas assignments. Since [ ] clericals will be hired this fiscal year for DDP, [ ] of which will be scheduled for overseas assignments, we are awaiting word from DDP to assist on any requirements which can not be handled by our present courses.

25X9

9. There has been close coordination with the Finance Division in establishing an informal agreement that JCT's assigned to Finance will take Budget and Finance Procedures before or shortly after starting their tour in Finance.

10. An informal survey of the Personnel Office was accomplished by interviewing each division chief in the Office of Personnel. Comments, evaluations and recommendations concerning various courses were forwarded in a memorandum on 13 March 1958. A valuable liaison function was performed in conducting this survey. Not only did OER benefit but the survey gave added impetus to the training consciousness which is increasing steadily throughout the Office of Personnel.

Courses evaluated during this survey were: Intelligence Orientation, Operations Support, Administrative Procedures, Conference Leadership, Management and Supervision, Operations Familiarization. External training: American Management Association; Human Relations Course (Cornell University); and Executive Management Training (University of Chicago).

25X1

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## Appendix D

### Sources

1. Memo, DTR to Chief, Military Personnel Division, Personnel Staff, sub: IAC Personnel for CIA Intelligence School Staff, 22 May 51, S (Records Center Job No. 55-110).
2. Ibid.
3. Memo, DTR to DDCI, sub: Schedule of Classes for CIA Intelligence School, 20 Jul 51, S (Records Center Job No. 55-110).
4. Weekly Summary Report, TR(G), 18 Jul 52, S (in files of OTR Historian).
5. Report of OTR Activities, Fiscal Year 1956, Tab C, S (in files of OTR Historian).
6. Ibid. Tab E.
7. Ibid. Tab G.
8. Memo, Deputy Chief, Intelligence School, to DTR, sub: Organizational Efficiency and Quality of Instruction in the Intelligence School, 14 Mar 57, S (in files of OTR Historian).

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25X1 9. Memo, [REDACTED] to DDTR, sub: Organization of Intelligence School, 4 Apr 57, S (in files of OTR Historian).

10. Written comments by [REDACTED] 6 Nov 70, S (in files of OTR Historian). 25X

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

25X1 13. Memo, [REDACTED] to DDTR (9, above).

14. Memo, Deputy Chief, Intelligence School to DTR (8, above).

15. Memo, Deputy Chief, Intelligence School to Chief, A&E Staff, sub: New courses in the Intelligence School, 4 Apr 57, C (in file of OTR Historian).

16. Written comments by [REDACTED] (10, above). 25X

17. Weekly Summary Report, DTR to Assistant to the DCI, 28 Sep 55, S (in files of OTR Historian).

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Weekly Summary Report, DTR to Assistant to the DCI, 28 Nov 55, S (in files of OTR Historian).

21. Weekly Summary Report, DTR to Assistant to the DCI, 9 Dec 55, S (in files of OTR Historian).

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22. Notes on non-Government Briefings by C/IS, 1959-69, S (in files of OTR Historian).
23. Weekly Activity Report, Chief, IS to DTR, 17 Jun 59, S (in files of OTR Historian).
24. Weekly Activity Report, Chief, IS to DTR, 21 May 62, S (in files of OTR Historian).
25. Weekly Activity Report, Chief, IS to DTR, 13 Mar 61, S (in files of OTR Historian).
26. Weekly Activity Report, Chief, IS to DTR, 6 Jun 61, S (in files of OTR Historian).
27. Weekly Activity Report, Chief, IS to DTR, 29 Mar 61, S (in files of OTR Historian).
28. Written comments by [redacted] (10, above). 25X
29. Memo, Chief Instructor, Intelligence Orientation, to Acting Chief, Intelligence School, sub: Course Data for IBM Record Cards, 13 Feb 57, S (in files of OTR Historian).
30. Memo, Chief, Intelligence Orientation Faculty to Deputy Chief, Intelligence School, sub: Report to President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (Killian Committee), 22 Sep 58, S (in files of OTR Historian).

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31. Ibid.
32. Written comments by [redacted] (10, above). 25X
33. Memo, Chief, Intelligence School, to Chief, Plans and Policy Staff, sub: Report to President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (Killian Committee), 26 Sep 58, S (in files of OTR Historian).
34. Ibid.
35. Written comments by [redacted] (10, above). 25X
36. Memo, DTR to Agency Training Officers, sub: Announcements and Descriptions of Training Courses, 8 Aug 56, S (in files of OTR Historian).
37. Memo, Chief, Orientation Faculty to Deputy Chief, Intelligence School (30, above).
38. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1961, Aug 60, S (in files of OTR Historian).
39. Memo, Chief, Intelligence Orientation Faculty to Chief, Intelligence School, sub: Summary of Major Activities and Accomplishments, 1960, 19 Jan 61, C (in files of OTR Historian).
40. Weekly Activity Report, Chief, IOF to Chief, IS, 24 Oct 61, S (in files of OTR Historian).

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41. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1961, (38, above).
42. Weekly Activity Report, Chief, IOF to Chief, IS, 26 Mar 62, S (in files of OTR Historian).
43. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1966, Sep 65, S (in files of OTR Historian).
44. Memo, Chief, Intelligence Orientation Faculty to Chief, Intelligence School (39, above).
45. Report of OTR Activities, Fiscal Year 1961, Section B, p. 3, S (in files of OTR Historian).
46. Written comments by [redacted] (10, above). 25>
47. Record of interview with [redacted] 2 Dec 25> 70, S (in files of OTR Historian).
48. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1960, 4 Aug 59, S (in files of OTR Historian).
49. Report of OTR Activities, Fiscal Year 1961 (45, above), Section B, p. 4.
50. Memo, DTR to Career Development Board, sub: Mid-Career Development Program, 26 Jun 61, S (in files of Secretary, Training Selection Board).

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51. Memo, Coordinator, Mid-Career Training to DTR, sub: Summary of Princeton Conference on Federal Agency Career Development, 27 Mar 62, C (in files of Secretary, Training Selection Board).
52. Memo, DTR to DDS, sub: CIA Training Programs (Proposed), 9 Jul 62, S (in files of Secretary, Training Selection Board).
53. Action Memo A-76, Executive Director to DDS for DTR, sub: CIA Career Training Program, 25 Oct 62, S (in files of Secretary, Training Selection Board).
54. Memo, Chairman, CIA Career Training Board to Members of the CIA Career Training Board, sub: Career Training Program, 18 Dec 62, S (in files of Secretary, Training Selection Board).  
25X1 55. Headquarters Notice [redacted] 29 Mar 63, S.
56. Memo, Executive Director to DTR, sub: Mid-Career Training, 11 Jun 63, S (in files of Secretary, Training Selection Board).
57. OTR Special Bulletin No. 30-63, sub: Midcareer Course, 19 Aug 63, S.  
25X1 58. Headquarters [redacted] Revised 3 Jun 65, C.
- 25X1 59. Headquarters Notice [redacted] 18 Dec 63, C.
- 25X160. Headquarters Reg [redacted] (58, above).

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61. Memo, DTR to Executive Director (no subject), 9 Mar 64, S (in files of Secretary, Training Selection Board).
62. Action Memo A-366, Executive Director to Chairman, CIA Training Selection Board, sub: Midcareer Training Programs, 11 Mar 64, S (in files of Secretary, Training Selection Board).
63. Memo, Chairman, Training Selection Board to DDP, sub: Mid-career Training Programs, 16 Mar 64, S (in files of Secretary, Training Selection Board).
64. Memo, Training Selection Board to Executive Director-Comptroller, sub: Midcareer Training Program, 2 May 64, S (in files of Secretary, Training Selection Board).
65. Action Memo A-388, Executive Director to Deputy Director for Intelligence, Plans, Science and Technology, and Support, sub: Midcareer Training Program, 25 Jun 64, S (in files of Secretary, Training Selection Board).
66. Memo, Chief, Intelligence Orientation Faculty to Deputy Chief, Intelligence School (30, above).
67. Memo, Chief, Intelligence Orientation Faculty to Chief, Intelligence School (39, above).
68. Ibid.

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69. Background sheet in 1970 schedule of JCS-DIA Orientation program, S (in files of OTR Historian).
70. Ibid.
71. OTR Announcements and Description of Training Courses, 4 May 56, S.
72. Weekly Activity Report, Chief, Intelligence School to DTR, 19 Jun 57, S (in files of OTR Historian).
73. Memo, Chief, Intelligence Production Faculty to Deputy Chief, Intelligence School, sub: Six-months Activities Report (Intelligence Production Faculty) March - August 1958, 19 Sep 58, S (in files of OTR Historian).
74. Written comments by [redacted] (10, above). 25)
75. Memo, Chief, Intelligence Production Faculty to Deputy Chief, Intelligence School (73, above).
76. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1960 (48, above).
77. Memo, Chief, Intelligence Production Faculty to Deputy Chief, Intelligence School (73, above).
78. Report of OTR Activities, Fiscal Year 1961, (45, above), Section A.

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79. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1961 (38, above).
80. Memo, Chief, Intelligence Production Faculty to Deputy Chief, Intelligence School (73, above).
81. Weekly Activity Report, Chief, Intelligence School to DTR, 12 May 60, S (in files of OTR Historian).
82. Ibid.
83. Memo, Chief, Intelligence School to DTR, sub: Writing Workshop Program, 17 Sep 62, S (in files of OTR Historian).
84. OTR Announcements and Description of Training Courses (71, above).
85. Ibid.
86. Memo, Chief, Intelligence Production Faculty to Deputy Chief, Intelligence School (73, above).
87. Memo, DTR to DDS, sub: Management Activity in the Office of Training, in Fiscal Year 1961, 13 Oct 61, S (in files of OTR Historian).
88. Report of OTR Activities, Fiscal Year 1961 (45, above), Section A.

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89. Weekly Activity Report, Chief, Intelligence Production Faculty to Chief, Intelligence School, 1958, S (cited but not specifically dated in document in files of OTR Historian).
90. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1961 (38 above).
91. Ibid.
92. Memo, Chief, Intelligence Production Faculty to Deputy Chief, Intelligence School (73, above).
93. Weekly Activity Report, Chief, Intelligence School, to DTR, 13 Feb 58, S (in files of OTR Historian).
94. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1959, 30 Sep 58, S (in files of OTR Historian).
95. Memo, Chief, Intelligence Production Faculty to Deputy Chief, Intelligence School (73, above).
96. Ibid.
97. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1960 (48, above).
98. Report of OTR Activities, Fiscal Year 1961 (45, above), Section A.

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99. Memo, Chief, Intelligence Production Faculty to Deputy Chief, Intelligence School (73, above).
100. Ibid.
101. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1960 (48, above).
102. Ibid.
103. Weekly Activity Report, Chief, Intelligence Production Faculty to Chief, Intelligence School, 10 Apr 61, S (in files of OTR Historian).
104. Weekly Activity Report, Chief, IPF, to Chief, IS, 4 Nov 62, S (in files of OTR Historian).
105. Memo, Chief Instructor, Intelligence Production, to Acting Chief, Intelligence School, sub: Request for Data for IBM Record Cards, 12 Feb 57, C (in files of OTR Historian).
106. Memo, Chief, Intelligence Production Faculty to Deputy Chief, Intelligence School (73, above).
107. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1960 (48, above).
108. Memo, Chief, Intelligence School, to Chief, Plans and Policy Staff (33, above).

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109. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1959 (94, above).
110. Memo, Chief, Intelligence Production Faculty, to Deputy Chief, Intelligence School (73, above).
111. Memo, Chief, Intelligence School to Chief, Plans and Policy Staff (33, above).
112. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1960 (48, above).
113. Ibid.
114. Report of OTR Activities, Fiscal Year 1956 (5, above).
115. Memo, Chief, Intelligence School to Chief, Plans and Policy Staff (33, above).
- 25X1 116. Letter from [redacted] to Colonel Lawrence K. White, 16 Feb 60 (in files of OTR Historian).
117. Memo, Chief, Management Training Faculty, to DTR, sub: Cost of Senior Management Seminar, 22 Nov 60, S (in files of OTR Historian).
118. Memo, DTR to DCI, sub: Appointment of [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] as Consultant to the Director of Training, 28 Nov 60, S (in files of OTR Historian).

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119. Memo, ADDS to DDP, sub: Second Presentation of the Senior Management Seminar [redacted] 11 Aug 61, S (in files of OTR Historian). 25X

120. Memo, Chief, Management Training Faculty to DTR, sub: Senior Management Seminar: Analysis of Critiques, undated, S (in files of OTR Historian).

121. Paper initialed [redacted] Senior Management Seminar (16-28 October 1961), undated, S (in files of OTR Historian). 25X

122. Memo of Conversation signed by [redacted] "Colonel White's Briefing of [redacted] on Friday, 5 May," 11 May 61, 25X1 not classified (in files of OTR Historian).

123. Memo, DTR to Nominees to the Seminar in Management Practices, 15 May 61, C (in files of OTR Historian).

124. Memo, Chief, Management Training Faculty to DTR, sub: Seminar in Management Practices, 11-17 June 1961; Analysis of Critiques, 17 Jul 61, S (in files of OTR Historian).

125. Training Plan: Seminar in Management Practices, 24-30 June 1962, not classified and undated (in files of OTR Historian).

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126. Memo, DTR to Nominees to the Seminar in Management Practices, undated, C (in files of OTR Historian).
127. Memo, Chief, Management Training Faculty to Chief, Support School, sub: Comments on [redacted] Report on the Pilot Project, 6 Jul 66, not classified (in files of OTR Historian). 25X
128. Memo, Chief, Intelligence School to Chief, Plans and Policy Staff (33, above).
129. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1960 (48, above).
130. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1961 (38, above).
131. Memo, Chief, Clerical Training to DC/IS, sub: Major Activities During March - August 1958: Clerical Training, 19 Sep 58, not classified (in files of OTR Historian).
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
134. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1961 (38, above).
135. Report of OTR Activities, Fiscal Year 1961, (45, above), Section F, p. 10.

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136. Ibid. Section F, p. 11.
137. Memo, Acting Chief, Administrative Training to Acting Chief, Intelligence School, sub: Course Data for IBM Record Cards, 18 Feb 57, S (in files of OTR Historian).
138. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1961 (38, above).
139. Report of OTR Activities, Fiscal Year 1961 (45, above), Section D, p. 7.
140. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1960 (48, above).
141. Ibid.
142. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1961 (38, above).
143. OTR Bulletin 24, Mar 57, p. 3, S.
144. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1960 (48, above).
145. OTR Narrative Justification for Budget Estimate, Fiscal Year 1961 (38, above).
146. Report of OTR Activities, Fiscal Year 1961 (45, above), Section D, p. 6.

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